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RECENT CASES
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER TO PRIVATE

GROUPS To SET WAGE
CONTRACTS. [Kentucky]

STANDARDS

FOR PUBLIC

CONSTRUCTION

A fundamental principle in a government of delegated and divided
powers, and one universally recognized in both state and federal constitutions, is that a legislature may not abdicate nor delegate its lawmaking function. However, it is apparent that a legislature in effectuating by law a general policy cannot predict every possible contingency
upon which the law shall become operative. Frequently, therefore,
resort must be had to administrative aid. Generally, it is held that
where a legislature has declared a policy with respect to the subject
matter of the law and a standard or framework to which administrative action must conform in the execution of that policy, the essential
legislative function has been accomplished, even though the administrative agency must necessarily exercise a limited discretion in the
application and furtherance of the law in particular circumstances.
The essence of legislative power, delegation of which to administrative
officials is prohibited, is the declaration of policy and standard.'
The prohibition against the delegation of legislative power to
private groups is applied even more strictly. Laws to which objection
has been made on the ground of such invalid delegation of legislative
power fall into three general categories: 2 (i) Laws depending for their
initiation upon the action of private groups. Examples are those
cases in which the administrative official may act only at the behest
of a private group or in execution of an agreement submitted by such
group. 3 (2) Laws depending in some manner upon the consent of
"'Accordingly, we look to the statute to see whether the Congress has declared
a policy with respect to that subject; whether the Congress has set up a standard
for the President's action; whether the Congress has required any finding by the
President in the exercise of the authority to enact the prohibition." Chief Justice
Hughes, in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 415, 55 S. Ct. 24i, 246,

79 L. ed. 446, 456 (1935)- See, also, J. W Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276
U. S. 394, 409, 48 S. Ct. 348, 352, 72 L. ed. 624, 630 (1928), for a similar view of
the 2essential legislative function.
Omitted from this classification are cases involving the delegation to private
groups of administrative duties, such as powers of appointment of public officers.
State v. Schorr, 65 A. (2d) 8io (Del. 1949); Ashmore v. Greater Greenville Sewer
Dist., 211 S. C. 77, 44 S. E. (2d) 88 (1947).
iSuch laws generally are held valid if the administrative official may modify
a submitted plan or submit one of his own, but invalid if initiation depends
entirely on the action of the private group. Maryland Co-op Milk Producers v.
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private persons, either by requiring their approval before going into
effect, 4 or by allowing modification or waiver of the law's effect through
the consent of interested persons. Laws subject to local option or
state-wide referendum 5 and zoning laws6 subject to the discretion of
the landowners are examples falling within this category. (3)Laws
whose essential contents or standards are determined by reference to
rules, standards or agreements established by private groups. Laws
adopting the safety standards," professional requirements, 8 wage
scales 9 or commercial practices 10 promulgated by lay groups fall
within this category.
Within the last-mentioned classification is the law questioned
recently in Baughn v. Gorrell & Riley. 1 A Kentucky statute12 required
that every public authority, in contracting for the construction of
public works, should ascertain, specify, make part of the contract,
and pay the local prevailing wages for the particular classes of work
employed in the construction. The statute further provided that the
Miller, 17o Md. 81, 182 At. 432 (1936); Arnold v. Board of Barber Examiners, 45
N. M. 57, io9 P- (2d) 779 (1941); Ex parte Herrm, 67 Okla. Crim. 104, 93 P (2d)
-1 (1939); La Forge v. Ellis, 175 Ore. 545, 154 P (2d) 844 (1945); Van Winkle v.
Fred Meyer, Inc., 151 Ore. 455, 49 P (2d) 1140 (1935); Revne v. Trade Commission,
192 P (2d) 563, 3 A. L. R. (2d) 169 (Utah 1948); Gibson Auto Co. v. Finnegan, 217
Wis. 401, 259 N. W

420 (1935).

'Curnin v. Wallace, 3o6 U. S. 1, 59 S. Ct. 379, 83 L. ed. 441 (1938); Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855, 8o L. ed. 116o (1936); Commonwealth
v. Beaver Dam Coal Co., 194 Ky. 34, 237 S. W io86, 27 A. L. R. 920 (1922).
rThe majority of the courts hold local option laws valid, but laws depending
on state-wide referendum invalid. In re Opinion of Justices, 42 S. (2d) 81 (Ala. 1949);
People ex rel. Thomson v. Barnett, 334 Ill. 62, 176 N. E. io8, 76 A. L. R. 1o44
(1931); Re Municipal Suffrage to Women, 16o Mass. 586, 36 N. E. 488, 23 L. R. A.
113 (1894); Bank of Chenango v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467 (1863); Gaud v. Walker,
214 S. C. 451, 53 S. E. (2d) 316 (1949).

'Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U. S. 116, 49 S. Ct. 50, 73 L. ed. 210 (1928);
Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U. S. 526, 37 S. Ct. 19 o , 61 L. ed. 472 (1917);
Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U. S. 137 , 33 S. Ct. 76, 57 L. ed. 156 (1912). See, also,

Leighton v. City of Minneapolis, 16 F. Supp. 1O (D. C. Minn. 1936); Whitaker
v. Green River Coal Co. et al., 276 Ky. 43, 122 S. W (2d) 1O2, 119 A. L. R. 1456
(1938); Union Trust Co. v. Simmons, 211 P (2d) igo (Utah 1949).
7Dudding v. Automatic Gas Co., 145 Tex. 1, 193 S. W
8

(2d) 517 (1946).

Allen v. State Board of Veterinarians, 72 R. I. 372, 52 A. (2d) 131 (1947).
WVagner v. City of Milwaukee, 177 Wis. 410, 188 N. W. 487 (1922). Similar
cases involving prices and hours standards fixed by the particular industries affected
are: Arnold v. Board of Barber Examiners, 45 N. M. 57, 1o9 P. (2d) 779 (1941);
La Forge v. Ellis, 175 Ore. 545, 154 P

(2d) 844 (1945); Revne v. Trade Commis-

sion, 192 P. (2d) 563, 3 A. L. R. (2d) 169 (Utah 1948).
21Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183,
57 S. Ct. 139, 81 L. ed. 109 (1936); Gibson Auto Co. v. Finnegan, 217 Wis. 401, 259
N. W. 420 (1935).
2311 Ky. 537, 224 S. W. (2d) 436 (1949).
'Ky. Rev. Stat. (1946) § § 337.510, 337.520.
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public authority should establish as "prevailing" those wages prevailing in the locality under collective bargaining agreements, if such
agreements applied to a sufficient number of employees to furnish a
reasonable basis for considering the wages as "prevailing" in the
locality. The defendant public authority (the Daviess County Board
of Education) and the defendant contractor failed to comply with the
provisions of the statute, and plaintiffs filed suit to have the contract
between defendants cancelled and to require the Board to comply
with the statute. The contractor contested the validity of the statute.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals declared the statute constitutional
and the contract invalid. Though recognizing as sound the principle
"that neither the Legislature nor any political subdivision possessing
legislative power may delegate the exercise of such power to private
persons or corporations,"i1 the court denied defendant's contention
that the statute required the public authority to accept, without discretion, wage rates fixed by private contracts between labor organizations and employers, on the grounds (i) that the statute had fixed
the legislative policy, (2) that it had established a not unreasonable
standard for the guidance of the public authorities-i.e., the local
prevailing union wage rates-and (3)that the public body remained
vested with a discretion in determining the reasonable prevailing
wage.
The decision was not without dissent. Justice Thomas maintained
that the standard set up by the statute was unreasonable, inasmuch
as the only discretion left within the public authority was the finding
that a prevailing wage existed, and not the determination that such
prevailing wage was fair or reasonable. Underlying his argument,
apparently, was the proposition that a prevailing wage law affecting
a public authority must, to be valid, meet the approval of that public
authority as to reasonableness and fairness. 14 He further construed
the Kentucky statute in question to be substantially identical to that
under consideration by the Wisconsin court in Wagner v. City of
Milwaukee. 5 In that case a city ordinance, rather than a state statute,
had required payment of wages under public contracts to be made
21Baughn et al. v. Gorrell & Riley et al., 311 Ky. 537, 224 S. W (2d) 436, 438
(1949)"But compare: "A municipality is merely a department of the state, and
the state may withhold, grant or withdraw powers and privileges as it sees fit.
However great or small its sphere of action, it remains the creature of the state
exercising and holding powers and privileges subject to the sovereign will." City
of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182, 187, 43 S. Ct. 534, 537, 67 L. ed. 937,
941 (1923)-

is177 Wis. 410, 188 N. W 487

(1922).
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equal to local prevailing union wages. The Wisconsin court held the
ordinance invalid as "nothing less than a surrender by the members
of the common council of the exercise of their independent, individual
judgments in the determination of a matter of legislative concern." 16
Despite the fact that the ordinance required a final approval by a
majority of the city council before the wage scale went into effect,
the court held that the ordinance must be assumed to have been
made in good faith and to bind the council to approval and that,
therefore, no discretion as to the standard remained in the council.
The majority of the Kentucky court distinguished the Kentucky
statute from the ordinance involved in the Wagner case, however,
on two grounds: that nowadays the union wage scale is generally
accepted as a reasonable standard for a prevailing wage, the opposite
having been true at the time the Wagner case was decided, in 1922;
and that the Wisconsin court construed the Milwaukee ordinance as
depriving the city council of discretion, while the Kentucky statute
left an exercisable discretion with the public authority.
The underlying significance of discretion in the public authority
emerges from the decisions in the Wagner and Baughn cases. Lack
of discretion in the Wagner case was a factor requiring invalidation,
apparently because the city council had neither by the exercise of
its independent, individual judgment established its own standard
in the ordinance, nor left within itself the ability to do so subsequently,
when the ascertained prevailing union wage scale should be presented
to it for approval by resolution. Even if the city council had been
admitted to possess a discretion in the use of the union scale, the
effect of such admission would have been to allow the council to
ignore the standard which it had set up in the ordinance and to
substitute instead a different standard-to make that which was
intended to be binding non-binding and in effect a nullity. On the
other hand, in the Baughn case a discretion exercisable by the public
authority rendered valid the legislation which would have been invalid
had it required acceptance of the union wage scale whether that
scale was or was not reasonably conformable to a prevailing wage
standard. The holding indicates that the prevailing wage was the
basic standard, and that the union scale was at most but an alternative
or sub-standard, binding only if substantially identical with the local
prevailing wage. Discretion was significant, then, in permitting the
use of the union wage as a standard only if such use was consistent
with the basic standard as applied by the public authority.
26177 Wis. 410, 88 N. W. 487, 489

(1922).

176

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. VII

The question remains whether a wage law would be invalid
because it adopts, outright, a union scale, without reference to the
prevailing scale. The validity of a law requiring payment to public
employees of the local prevailing wage has been established. 17 The
standard adopted by such law may be said to depend on the law of
supply and demand' s rather than on the action of persons, even
though the standard be a variable, and be obviously affected to some
degree by the actions and contracts of private persons. However, the
validity of a law whose standard depended to a much less degree on
the law of supply and demand and to a much greater degree on the
action of private persons-as one adopting as its standard such wage
scale as may be agreed upon by a single private manufacturer and
his employees-has not been established. Such a law would appear
invalid because it would leave the establishment and variation of the
standard too much within the control of private individuals. 19
A law embracing a union wage standard would lie somewhere
between a prevailing wage law and the hypothetical law last mentioned, in its susceptibility to private control. However, union wage
scales seem not yet so universal as to be identical with prevailing
wages. They are established by parties neither disinterested nor with
interests concurrent with the public, but on the contrary by parties
"Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207, 24 S. Ct. 124, 48 L. ed. 148 (1903) (local current
rate of per diem wages): Ryan v. New York, 177 N. Y. 271, 69 N. E. 599 (1904)
(local prevailing rate for a day's work in the same trade); Norris v. Lawton, 47
Okla. 213, 148 Pac. 123 (1915) (local current rate of per diem wages); Malette v.
City of Spokane, 77 Wash. 205, 137 Pac. 496 (1913) (going rate of wages). Furthermore, that a legislature may adopt sn its presently existing form a wage scale
established by private groups seems undeniable. The legislature in such case
may be presumed to have considered the applicability of the adopted standard
to its own policy, and to have exercised its judgment in making the standard its
own. Dudding v. Automatic Gas Co., 145 Tex. 1, 193 S. W (2d) 517 (1946) (adoption of safety rules in privately published pamphlet); Allen v. State Board of
Veterinarians, 72 R. I. 372, 52 A. (2d) 131 (1947) (statute requiring state veterinarians to be graduated from schools approved by veterinarians' associations construed to adopt only the then-existing standard).
'ALong Island Railway Company v. Department of Labor, 256 N. Y. 498, 177
N. E. 17 (1931). In Morse v. Delaney, 128 Misc. 317, 218 N. Y. Supp. 571 (1926), the
court defined "prevailing rate of wages" as the "fair market rate," and in holding
valid a statute providing for the payment of the prevailing rate, over objections
of indefiniteness, pointed out the superiority of a wage scale variable by the law
of supply and demand.
"That such a law would conflict also with due process requirements because
not a reasonable means of attaining the legislative policy is not improbable.
However, the prohibition against delegation of legislative power appears a more
positive protection of the public interest than are due process requirements in
this type of case, in requiring legislative acts of public concern to be accomplished
by governmental officials answerable to the public for their actions.
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strongly self-interested. Since a standard so established could scarcely
be classified as a mere impersonal fact governed by the law of supply
and demand, adoption of it, subject to future change by private
action, would appear contrary to the rule against delegation of legislative power. The Baughn decision itself impliedly agreed with this
proposition, in holding discretion within the public authority to be
necessary to the validity of the Kentucky statute. This being so, the
decision seems proper.
However, not all decisions upholding the validity of legislation
protested as in contravention of the rule against delegation of legislative power to private groups have had such apparent justification
as did the Baughn decision. Zoning legislation allowing avoidance
of its restraint upon the consent of adjacent landowners, for instance,
has been the source of conflicting decisions based on tenuous distincdons: whether an included restraint is first absolute and then avoidable, or becomes absolute only when property owners act;20 and
whether the restraint is otherwise in conflict with due process requirements as embodying unreasonable, arbitrary and non-uniform features.2 - Legislation regulating particular groups or industries and
becoming effective only upon such groups' affirmative votes has been
upheld in some cases as the mere exercise of a legislative power to
append a condition to the circumstances in which a law becomes
operative.2 2 Legislation allowing local option has been distinguished
2°"From an analysis of the cases, it is clear that, where the law is complete
in itself and its operation does not depend on an act of property owners, a consent
provision is valid; but, where the law is not complete in itself, is not effective
until the property owners act, and it is their action that imposes the restriction and that has the force and effect of law, it is invalid, because it then
contains an unauthorized delegation of legislative power." Leighton v. City of
Minneapolis, 16 F. Supp. ioi, io6 (D. C. Minn. 1936). Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge,
278 U. S. i16, 49 S. Ct. 50, 73 L. ed. 210 (1928); Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago,
242 U. S. 526, 37 S. Ct. 19o, 61 L. ed. 472 (i917); Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U. S.
137, 33 S. Ct. 76, 57 L. ed. 156 (1912).
21Occasionally courts seek reconciliation of conflicting decisions on the ground
that consent legislation held void because involving an invalid delegation of legislative power was also invalid because it was class legislation, unreasonable, or
violative of procedural due process in permitting deprivation of property at the
arbitrary will of a private group. The bases of the decisions themselves are sometimes ambiguously expressed, perhaps because the laws in question are often
subject to both objections. However, such reconciliation, insofar as it may indicate
non-recognition of the rule against delegation of legislative power as invalidating
in itself, would appear improper. Whitaker v. Green River Coal Co. et al., 276
Ky. 43, 122 S. W (2d) 1912, iig A. L. R. 1456 (1938).
nCurrin v. Wallace, 3o6 U. S. 1, 59 S. Ct. 379, 83 L. ed. 441 (1938); Holcombe
v. Georgia Milk Producers Confederation, 188 Ga. 358, 3 S. E. (2d) 705 (1939).
Application of such a rule to its logical extreme would seem to wipe out the
principle against abdication of the legislative function.
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from that allowing state-wide referendum on the ground that in the
exercise of local option the local group is not acting as that state
body which has delegated its law-making power to the state legislature. 23 Delegation by a legislature of appointive power to private
groups has been said to be justifiable if the appointing body has
24
some reasonable relationship to the body appointed.
Lack of any substantial basis for distinction in these cases has
led to the view that delegation of essential legislative power is frequently permitted, 25 and has led even to comment advocating a
relaxation of the rule against-such delegation. 26 Undoubtedly a few
courts have failed to apply the prohibition when they might have
done so. However, it does not follow that the rule should be abandoned. Some sacrifice of efficiency may result from application of the
prohibition, but until the law-making process becomes much more
complex than it is at this time, and until the legislative bodies are
proved to have exhausted the law-making resources they now possess,
no sufficient reason appears for the abandonment of a rule basic to
representative government.
FRANK E.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw-DAMAGES

JUDGMENT

FOR BREACH

BEVERLY

OF RACIAL

RESTRICTIVE COVENANT AS VIOLATION OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
[Missouri]
Though the Supreme Court's decision in Shelley v. Kraemer1 has
been widely hailed as a virtual nullification of racial restrictive covenants in deeds, 2 that decision, of course, actually involved only the
specific question of whether state court enforcement of racial restrictive covenants, by injunction or specific performance, denied the
"Bank of Chenango v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467 (1863).
2Ashmore v. Greater Greenville Sewer District, 211 S. C. 77, 44 S. E. (2d)
88 (1947).
"See Hale, Our Equivocal Constitutional Guaranties (1939) 39 Col. L. Rev.
563; Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups (1937) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 2oi; Ray,
Delegation of Power to State Administrative Agencies in Texas (1937-1938) 16
Tex. L. Rev. 2o; Note (1932) 32 Col. L. Rev. 8o.
"See Note (1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 447.
2334 U. S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. ed. 1161, 3 A. L. R. (2d) 441 (1948). The early
case of Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 6o, 38 S. Ct. 16, 62 L. ed. 149 (1917), held
that legislation imposing racial segregation was unconstitutional,
2Barnett,
Race-Restrictive Covenants Cases Restricted (1948) 28 Ore. L. Rev. i;

Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive
Covenant Cases (1949) 16 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 203; Notes (1948) 48 Col. L. Rev. 1241;
(1948) 61 Harv. L. Rev. i45o; (1949) 6 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 192.
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Negro the equal protection of the laws in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 It was conceded that voluntary enforcement by
the parties is legal, 4 but the Court did not discuss or pass upon the
validity of a judgment for damages for breach of such covenants
against the white vendor or lessor.
The recent case of Weiss v. Leaon 5 is the first case since Shelley v.
Kraemer6 to render a decision on the specific question of whether a
white property owner, entitled to the benefit of a racial restrictive
covenant, may recover damages against a white property owner who
breaches such covenant by selling or leasing the restricted property
to a Negro. Plaintiff and defendant are white covenantees of lots
subject to a racial restrictive agreement which provides that none of
the lots may be devised, sold, leased, or occupied by Negroes. Defendant sold or was about to sell his lot to a Negro, and plaintiff brought
an action to enforce the covenant or, in the alternative, to recover
damages for breach of such covenant. The trial couirt dismissed the
entire action on the authority of the Shelley case. The Supreme Court
of Missouri held that the dismissal as to the injunctive relief was
proper, but reversed as to the dismissal of the count for damages
and remanded the case for trial against the white vendor.
It was conceded that the Shelley case precluded any form of "judicial enforcement"' 7 of racial restrictive covenants, but the position
was taken that a judgment for damages was not such enforcement.
Noting the dictum in the Shelley case that the covenant standing
alone was valid,8 the Missouri court declared: "For the breach of
3U. S. Const. Amend. XIV provides that, "No State shall
deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The Shelley case held that judicial
enforcement of racial restrictive covenants by state courts was state action.
"Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 13, 68 S. Ct. 836, 842, 92 L. ed. 1161, x18o
(1948): "That Amendment [Fourteenth] erects no shield against merely private
conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful. We conclude, that the restrictive
agreements standing alone cannot be regarded as violative of any rights guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment. So long as the purposes of those agreements are
effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms, .. there has been no action by
the state and the provisions of the Amendment have not been violated."
'225 S. W (2d) 127 (Mo. 1949).
0334 U. S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. ed. 1161 (1948).
"The Shelley case reversed a state court's decision which had granted specific
enforcement and cancellation of the deed. However, the language of the Court
was broader than the factual question presented. The Court did not say that it
was the specific enforcement that was unconstittuional but "judicial enforcement."
334 U. S. i, 20, 68 S. Ct. 836, 845, 92 L. ed. 1161, 183 (1948). See Note (195o) 21
Tenn. L. Rev. 441.
'This dictum is criticized in Frank, The United States Supreme Court x947-48
(1948) 16 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 1, 24.
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a valid agreement there is ordinarily a remedy by way of damages.
The fact that another remedy, specific performance, is ruled out
because of constitutional reasons, need not necessarily affect the
remedy by way of damages unless it, too, is unconstitutional under
the circumstances. Under the facts of this case, we hold that according to the law as we now understand it, the trial court may hear and
determine an action for damages for the breach of the restriction
agreement in question
without violating any provision of the
Federal or State Constitutions."9
Very little affirmative argument is advanced to support the pivotal
point of the decision that a suit for damages for breach of covenant
does not involve judicial enforcement of the covenant. Most of the
opinion is devoted to demonstrating the generally accepted fact that
the Shelley case did not determine the issue of a damages recovery
as presented in the present controversy, but merely ruled against the
availability of specific enforcement by the courts. Having thus excluded, to its own satisfaction, the effect of the United States Supreme
Court's decision, the Missouri court resolved the basic issue of the
case by observing that "Except for the constitutional issue advanced
under Shelley v Kraemer there is no question under the general law
but that the remedy of damages for breach of the agreement would
be available." 10
The Missouri court drew an analogy to cases,"i decided before
the Shelley case, which employed the principle that even though an
equity court has jurisdiction it may in its discretion deny specific
enforcement of restrictive covenants because of hardship or changed
neighborhood conditions, without impairment of the right to recover
damages for breach of such covenants. These decisions were accepted
as demonstrating that the fact a covenant is not specifically enforceable does not prevent the awarding of damages for its breach. However, the court failed to notice the significant distinction that in such
cases decided subsequent to the Shelley case, an equity court would
not be at liberty to exercise its discretion but must refuse specific
enforcement of restrictive covenants because to grant the relief would
be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.12 It is certainly arguS. W (2d) 127, 131 (Mo. 1949).
"Weiss v. Leaon, 225 S. W 127, 13o (Mo. 1949).
2Borssuch v. Pantaleo, 183 Md. 148, 36 A. (2d) 527 (1944); Rombauer v.
Compton Heights Christian Church, 328 Mo. 1, 40 S. W (2d) 545 (1931); Welitoff
v. Kohl, 1 5 N. J. Eq. 181, 147 A. 39o (1929).
22See Note (195o) 63 Harv. L. :Rev. io62.
OWeiss v. Leaon, 225
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able that the court would also be without power to give damages as
an alternative relief. 13
In taking the view that a judgment for damages was not judicial
enforcement of restrictive covenants, the court in Wezss v. Leaon 14
apparently has both overlooked prominent authority and disregarded
policy considerations. Contracts which contravene public policy or
are barred by the Statute of Limitations are held unenforceable and
not void, yet a judgment for damages for breach of such contracts
is considered enforcement and may be reversed. 15 The American
Law Institute's Restatement of the Law considers a judgment for
damages for breach as enforcement of the contract.' 6
Most cases subsequent to the Shelley case which have considered
the problem involved enforcement by injunction, and the Shelley case
was followed. However, the decisions of two important cases indicate
that the Shelley case will not be limited to its specific facts but will
nullify any judicial process which effectuates or sanctions racial
restrictive covenants. Clifton v. Puente17 involved a deed which contained a covenant that prohibited the sale or lease of the property
to persons of Mexican descent. The covenant stipulated that if the
land was sold to one of the restricted race, all title of the then owner
would be forfeited to the original grantor. The land was sold to a
Mexican but before he took possession the grantor entered the
premises. The Mexican vendee brought a suit in statutory trespass
to try title, and the court refused to allow the grantor to use the
1
The Missouri court substantiated its argument that the question as to the
right to maintain an action for damages for breach of a racial restrictive covenant
remained open by citing Note (1948) 3 A. L. R. (2d) 466, 473, which took this
view and cited two cases prior to the Shelley case. Chandler v. Ziegler, 88 Colo.
i, 291 Pac. 822 (igo), allowed a recovery of damages in an action for deceit based
on the vendor's fraudulent representation that all the lots in the subdivision were
racially restricted. Eason v. Buffaloe, 198 N. C. 52o, 152 S. E. 496 (ig3o) held that a
purchaser of a racially restricted lot had a cause of action for damages against his
vendor based upon the latter's breach of a covenant that none of the lots in the
subdivision should be sold to or occupied by Negroes. It is submitted that these
two cases would not now in the light of the Shelley case be authority for the principle on which they were originally decided.
"1225S. IV. (2d) 127 (MO. 1949).
nOakland Motor Car Co. v. Indiana Automobile Co., 201 Fed. 499, 504 (C. C. A.
7 th, 1912); Marvin v. Solvental Chemical Products, 298 Mich. 296, 298 N. W. 782,
784 (1941); Wgilhelm Lubrication Co. v. Brattrud, 197 Minn. 626, 268 N. W. 634,
637 (1936); St. Regis Paper Co. v. Hubbs & Hastings Paper Co., 235 N. Y. 3o, 138
N. E. 495, 497 (1923); Cianciarulo v. Caldarane, 69 R. I. 86, 3o A. (2d) 843, 845 (1943).
"Restatement, Contracts (1932) §§ 13, 14, 178-225, 598-609. See Ames, Specific
Performance For and Against Strangers to the Contract (19o3) 17 Harv. L. Rev. 174,
177; Note (1949) 12 U. of Detroit L. J. 81.
'218 S. W. (2d) 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
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forfeiture clause as a defense, on the reasoning that it would violate
the spirit of the Shelley case.
In Claremont Improvement Club v. Buckzngham,1 8 the court,
while recognizing that the Shelley case did not hold restrictive covenants invalid, refused to grant a declaratory judgment to declare
their validity. It was reasoned that a declaratory judgment would
serve no useful purpose because the Shelley case prohibited the use
of "any" judicial process to give the judgment effect. This decision
seems to imply that judicial process forbidden by the Shelley case
includes a judgment for damages for breach of the covenant as well
as specific performance.
Many of the comments on the Shelley case took the view that
a judgment for damages for breach of a covenant would fall within
the scope of judicial enforcement prohibited by the Supreme Court's
decision.' 9 The law reviews which have commented on the Weiss
case have taken the same view and have stated that the decision will
probably be reversed if appealed.20 Other indirect methods that will
probably be used to avoid the Shelley decision have been commented
upon, but the conclusion is that there is no effective method, if the
courts must sanction the action, to evade the rule of the Shelley case. 21
A judgment for damages for breach of a racial restrictive covenant
should be considered enforcement of a covenant as well as the equitable remedy of specific performance. The two remedies are simply
22
different methods of enforcement of a legal obligation.
Weiss v. Leaon,2 3 on its facts, can be distinguished from the
Shelley case on the ground that the forms of relief are different. Also,
it has been argued that the court's enforcement of damages against
the white vendor has such a remote detrimental effect on the constitutional right of the colored race to purchase property without
discrimination that the court's granting a judgment for damages
182 oo P (2d) 47 (Cal. 1948).
"Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth mendment: The Restrictive
Covenant Cases (1949) 16 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 203 , 217; Scanlan, Racial Restrictions
in Real Estate-Property Values Versus Human Values (1948) 24 Notre Dame Law.
157, 182; Notes (1948) 46 Mich. L. Rev. 978, 48 Col. L. Rev. 1241, 1244.

"°Notes (1950) 3o B. U. L. Rev. 273, 18 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 417, 63 Harv. L.
1O62, 98 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 588, 21 Tenn. L. Rev. 441.
"Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive
Covenant Cases (1949) 16 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 203 , 224: "When the various proposals
are considered, the conclusion seems warranted that the Restrictive Covenant decisions render ineffective any devise for maintaining residential segregation whose
usefulness depends on utilization of governmental authority to achieve its end."
"See Notes (1950) 3o B. U. L. Rev. 273, 18 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 417, 4i8.
"225 S. W (2d) 127 (Mo. 1949).
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does not infringe the constitutional right of the Negro which the
Shelley case protects. However, there are many social elements, not
including judicial action, which produce a reluctance of the white
property owner to sell to Negroes.2 4- If this reluctance is considered
with the inevitable threat of a pecuniary liability, it can hardly be
said that the detrimental effect to the Negro is so remote as to remove
the case from the scope of the protection given the Negro in the
Shelley case.
The Shelley case does not state or imply that only injunctive
relief granted by a court would be a denial of the equal protection
of the laws. The use of judicial process or judicial enforcement held
unconstitutional seems to refer not to specific performance alone, but
to any judicial action which results in substantial pressure on a party
to perform the covenant. Certainly, the threat of having to pay damages for breach is a strong force to induce parties to perform. Thus,
the recognition of the damages remedy tends to defeat the policy
which the Supreme Court must have intended to promote in the
Shelley case. Since the damages recovery cannot be obtained without
the authority of a court being invoked, the spirit of the Shelley case
is violated by the view of the Weiss case.
It is conceded that specific performance is a more effective remedy
to enforce restrictive covenants than a judgment for damages for
breach of the covenant, but enforcement by damages would indirectly
obtain the result which the Shelley case held to be a denial of the
equal protection of the laws. The Negro is limited in his power to
purchase property due to his meager income. Even though a wute
property owner was willing to sell, he would indemnify himself by
including in the price of the property the amount of damages his
breach of a restrictive covenant would cost him, and this would make
the purchase price of the property prohibitive in the usual case. An
effective means of racial segregation through private agreements or
restrictive covenants would thus be sanctioned and effectuated by
the coercive power of judicial fiat.
OTIs E.

PINION

-"Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive
Covenant Cases (1949) 16 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 203.
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WARRANT AS INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREST.

AND SEIZURE

WITHOUT

[United States Supreme

Court]
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures,1 was framed against a
background in which the English authorities had used general search
warrants in England and writs of assistance in Colonial America to
search for and suppress elements of political discontent and to help
enforce harsh duties and customs imposed on the Colonies. 2 Such
searches and seizures greatly embittered the Colonists and have been
regarded as one of the chief causes of the American Revolution.3
The broad provisions of the Amendment have been interpreted
to mean that generally a "reasonable search" is a search based on a
valid search warrant-that is, a search warrant based on probable
cause and sworn to under oath. 4 As an effective means of enforcing
the Amendment, a rule has been established that evidence obtained
by a search and seizure in violation thereof by federal officers is inadmissible in the federal courts. 5 As exceptions to the general rule,
warrantless searches have been permitted under the following circumstances: (i) in the case of moving vehicles where probable cause exists
that a crime has been committed, searches have been permitted without a warrant since otherwise the vehicle might move out of the locality
while a warrant is being obtained; 6 (2) as incident to a valid arrest,
the person arrested may be searched in order to seize means of
escape, or means of harming the officers, and to prevent the destruction
of evidence of the crime; 7 (3) as incident to a valid arrest, the "premises
1
The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The Amendment is a restriction on the Federal Government and not on the states. Adams v. New York, 192
U. S. 585, 24 Ct. 372, 48 L. ed. 575 (1904). In the recent case of Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U. S. 25, 69 S. Ct. 1359, 93 L. ed. 1782 (1949), the Amendment was stated to
be applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but such statement was dictum.
2
See Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 624, 6 S. Ct. 524, 529, 29 L. ed. 746,
749 (1886); Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures (1921) 34 Harv. L. Rev.
361, 362.
2See
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 624, 6 S. Ct. 524, 529, 29 L. ed. 746,
749 (1886); Cooley, Constitutional Limitations ( 5th ed. 1883) 365.
4Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law (1939) 743; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations ( 5 th ed. 1883) 369.
'Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. ed. 652 (i914).
OCarroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 28o, 69 L. ed. 543 (925)7Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 46 S. Ct. 4, 70 L. ed. 145 (1925).
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in the immediate control" of the person arrested may be searched.8
The third exception has been a source of much litigation in the
federal courts due to the ever-changing definition by the courts of
"premises in the immediate control" of the arrested person.
After Weeks v. United States9 established the federal exclusionary
rule in 1914, the decisions had been so limited that objects "in the
immediate control" of the arrested person meant only visible objects
in his immediate presence. 10 However, Harris v. United States," decided in 1947, abolished the visibility requirement and broadened
the phrase "in the immediate control" to include a four-room apartment of the person arrested. The action of the police officers was
countenanced even though the objects seized and for the possession
of which the defendant was convicted had nothing to do with the
crime for which he was arrested. This search most certainly would
have fallen into the classification of general exploratory searches for
evidentiary matters prohibited by earlier cases. 12 The Harris case has
gone further in broadening the scope of a reasonable search than any
of the other cases on the subject.
In 1948, the Supreme Court in Trupzano v. United States'3 introduced the requirement that where practicable a search warrant must
be obtained prior to the search. Since this requirement had not been
met, the search was illegal, notwithstanding the fact that the person
was lawfully arrested in a barn and the objects seized were plainly
visible and within easy reach of the officers. The Court took care to
distinguish the Harris case on a factual basis and said that that case
was concerned with the scope of a general search as incident to arrest. 14
Both cases were five-to-four decisions, and the sudden change in
the law was due to the shifting of Justice Douglas from the majority
8Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 46 S. Ct. 4, 70 L. ed. 145 (1925);
Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192, 48 S. Ct. 74, 72 L. ed. 231 (1927).
0232 U. S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. ed. 652 (1914).
"Compare United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 52 S. Ct. 420, 76 L. ed.
877 (1932) and Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 5i S. Ct.
153, 75 L. ed. 374 (1931) with Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192, 48 S. Ct. 74,
72 L. ed. 231 (1927). The Lefkowitz case and the Go-Bart case limited the holding
of the Matron case to visible objects.
u331 U. S. 145, 67 S. Ct. io98, 91 L. ed. 1399 (1947).
"United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 52 S. Ct. 420, 76 L. ed. 877 (1932);
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S.344, 51 S. Ct. 153, 75 L. ed. 374
(1931).
"334 U. S. 699, 68 S. Ct. 1229, 92 L. ed. 1663 (1948).
" However, it appears that even in the Harris case there was ample time to
get a search warrant.
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side in the Harrzs case to join the members of the dissent in that case
who formed the majority side in the Trupzano case. 15
Against this background, the recent case of United States v.
Rabinowttzl6 came before the Court, but in the interim since the
Trupiano decision Justices Clark and Minton had replaced Justices
Murphy and Rutledge, the two latter justices having been on the
majority side in the Trupiano case. In the Rabinowztz case, federal
officers, learning of defendant's dealing in stamps bearing forged overprints, arranged a plot whereby a postal employee went to defendant's
office and purchased four stamps which were found to have forged
overprints. A week later an arrest warrant was obtained and officers,
accompanied by stamp experts, went to defendant's one-room office,
arrested him, searched a desk, safe, and file cabinets, and found 573
stamps bearing forged overprints. The search was made without a
warrant and over the defendant's objections. On trial for selling,
possessing, and concealing stamps with forged overprints with intent
to defraud, the defendant was convicted after he had made a timely
motion to suppress the 573 stamps as evidence. The Court of Appeals
reversed, relying on the Trupzano case, holding that since the officers
had had time to get a search warrant and had failed to do so, the
search was invalid under the Fourth Amendment and thus the 573
stamps were inadmissible as evidence. 17
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals,
overruling the Trupiano case to the extent that a search warrant is
required if it is practicable to get one, and decided that a search
incident to lawful arrest is valid without a warrant if it is "reasonable." What is reasonable is not a fixed formula but is to be
decided according to the circumstances of each case. The Court
declared that the search was reasonable here because: "(i) the search
and seizure were incident to a valid arrest; (2) the place of search
was a business room to which the public, including the officers, was
invited; (3)the room was small and under the immediate and complete
control of respondent; (4) the search did not extend beyond the room
"In the Harris case Chief Justice Vinson, Justices Black, Reed, Douglas, and
Burton were on the majority side, with Justices Frankfurter, Murphy, Rutledge,
and Jackson dissenting. In the Trupiano case, the Court's members being the
same, Justices Frankfurter, Murphy, Rutledge, Jackson, and Douglas formed the
majority.
-339 U. S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L. ed. 407 (1950). In the five-to-three decision,
Chief Justice Vinson, Justices Minton, Clark, Burton, and Reed formed the majority,
with Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Black dissenting. Justice Douglas did not
participate.
"'United States v. Rabinowitz, 176 F. (2d) 732 (C. A. 2d, 1949).
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used for unlawful purposes; (5) the possession of the forged and altered
stamps was a crime, just as it is a crime to possess burglars' tools, lottery tickets or counterfeit money."' 8
The Harris case was cited as ample authority for the holding, and
the Court said that the Trupiano case had been based on an erroneous
interpretation of Taylor v. United States.19 Furthermore, it was reasoned that hasty searches can be redressed by the courts, and some
20
leeway should be given to officers in their efforts to capture criminals.
In a separate dissent by Justice Frankfurter, in which Justice
Jackson concurred, the Court's opinion was strongly criticized as being
contrary to the Fourth Amendment. 21 It was stated that the Amendment was framed after a bitter experience with the general search
warrants of the English and that it was the framers' intent that a
search without warrant should be made only in cases of absolute
necessity, 22 such cases being: (i) searches of moving vehicles; (2)
searches of the person incident to arrest; (3) searches and seizures of
visible objects in the immediate presence of the person arrested.
Otherwise it was argued that the Amendment requires an impartial
magistrate to pass upon the propriety of whether a search will be
made. Furthermore, the test of reasonableness laid down by the Court
furnishes no guide at all to the lower courts; it restricts and endangers
privacy by giving too much leeway to officers; it permits the result of
2sUnited States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 64, 70 S. Ct. 430, 434, 94 L. ed.
407, 412 (195o).
i2286 U. S. 1, 52 S. Ct. 466, 76 L. ed. 951 (1932). Officers had received complaints
of defendant's activities for about a year, but they searched his garage without a
warrant and prior to arresting him. Thus, there was no prior arrest to legalize
the entry and search.
20
The Court stated: "Whether there was time may well be dependent upon
considerations other than the ticking off of minutes or hours. The judgment of
the officers as to when to close the trap on a criminal committing a crime in their
presence or who they have reasonable cause to believe is committing a felony is
not determined solely upon whether there was time to procure a search warrant.
Some flexibility will be accorded law officers in daily battle with criminals for
whose restraint criminal laws are essential." United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S.
56, 65, 70 S. Ct. 430, 435, 94 L. ed. 407, 413 (195o).
mUnited States v. Rabnowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 68, 70 S. CLt. 430, 436, 94 L. ed.
407, 415 (i95o). Justice Black dissented separately on the grounds that even though
he regarded the Trupiano rule as merely a judicially-created rule of evidence rather
than a constitutional command, still it should be adhered to because: (i) otherwise,
existing confusion will be increased; (2) the rule should be given enough time to
see how it works; (3) the interest of privacy outweighs the fact that now and then
a criminal may go free. 339 U. S. 56, 66, 70 S. CLt.430, 444, 94 L. ed. 407, 414 (1950)-2"Words must be read with the gloss of the experience of those who framed
them." United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 70, 70 . Ct. 430, 436, 94 L. ed.
407, 415 (195o).
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a general search forbidden by the Fourth Amendment by legalizing a
search made incident to arrest even if the arrest is for a minor or
trumped-up charge. Finally, the dissent contended that cases should
not be overruled at a time when the Court's members are changing,
in the absence of manifest need therefor, since it makes the law look
like a matter of chance.
The past cases on the subject are conflicting and are full of technical distinctions, so that either the majority or the Frankfurter dissent could find authority for its holding. The Harris case is ample
authority for the holding of the majority opinion, and the Trupzano
case would be authority for the dissent. However, in the light of the
Trupiano case there seems to be some inconsistency in the present
stand of the Frankfurter dissent. In the Trupiano case a search warrant was a sine qua non to the validity of a search if there was time
to get one, even though the objects seized were visible, but in the
principal case the Frankfurter dissent dispenses with the search warrant requirements if the objects seized are visible.
As a practical matter the test of reasonableness offers no hope of
clarifying the status of the law in this confused field, whereas the
dissent's standard does, and such clarity should be a most important
consideration at the present time. Furthermore, though the majority
opinion will give officers more leeway in making searches and seizures,
and by broadening the scope of a warrantless search will reduce the
protection accorded the defendant by the federal exclusionary rule,
the gain is questionable since it must be offset against the loss of the
individual's privacy. And the protection of privacy seems more important than ever before, in view of the enormous growth of government in recent years with its influences reaching into nearly every
phase of private life, making it uncertain where government ends
and individual rights begin. Thus, it would seem desirable to have
a constitutional sanction of a prior-search-warrant requirement guarding the rights of privacy, rather than to leave this fundamental liberty
to the mercy of a "rule of reasonableness" to be administered by the
lower federal courts.
RUSH P WEBB

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VALIDITY OF ZONING ORDINANCE PROHIBITING
ESTABLISHED PERMISSIVE USE OF PROPERTY. [Nebraska]

The recognized purpose of zoning is to regulate and stabilize the
growth of communities, this regulation being justified by the conse-
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quent protection it affords to the health, safety, and welfare of the
general public.1 For this reason the enactment of zoning legislation
is deemed necessary even though it places restrictions on the use of
property that in days past would have been considered an unreason2
able and unlawful interference with private ownership.
The constitutionality of comprehensive zoning ordinances in general as a valid exercise of the state's police power 3 was established in
1926 by the Supreme Court of the United States in Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Company.4 Such ordinances must bear a rational
relation to the public health, safety, or welfare and they must not be
clearly unreasonable or arbitrary.5 Inevitably, some degree of arbitrariness will be evidenced, for the reasonableness of the ordinance
must be determined by the balancing of social utility against individual rights. If it is determined that the overall public benefit reasonably warrants restrictions placed on certain individual uses of
property, then the courts ordinarily will uphold such exercise of legislative discretion.6
However, the general rule is that a vested right must not be
destroyed arbitrarily by such enactments. 7 This problem of vested
rights is the most usual basis of litigation in zoning controversies now
that the constitutionality of zoning ordinances in general has been
been established. The recent case of City of Omaha v. Glissman8 is
illustrative of this frequent basis for attack on zoning regulations.
The Glissman case involved an action brought by the city to enjoin
the defendant from further construction or operation of a tourist
and trailer camp. Defendant was the lessee of a golf course and had
23 McQuillin, Muncipal Corporations (2d ed. 1943) § 1o26.
-See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 387, 47 S. Ct. 114,
118, 71 L. ed. 3o3, 310 (1926): "Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of
which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have
been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive."
1
The municipality's power to zone must be granted by the state as it is not
an inherent power of the city itself. Clements v. McCabe, 21o Mich. 207, 177 N. W
722 (192o); 58 Am. Jur., Zoning § 7.
'272 U. S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L. ed. 303 (1926).
Willage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L. ed.
303 (1926); Cassel Realty Co. v. City of Omaha, 144 Neb. 753, 14 N. W (2d) 6oo
(1944)OHadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394, 36 S. Ct. 143, 6o L. ed. 348 (1915);
Eggebeen v. Sonnenburg, 339 Wis. 213, 1 N. W (2d) 84, 138 A. L. R. 495 (1941);
3 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d ed. 1943) 419.
iReynolds v. McArthur, 2 Pet. 417, 7 L. ed. 470 (U. S. 1829); Baker v. Somerville, 138 Neb. 466, 293 N. W. 326 (1940); Cassel Realty Co. v. City of Omaha, 144
Neb. 753, 14 N. W (2d) 600 (1944).
839 N. W. (2d) 828 (Neb. 1949).

19o

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. VII

leased the adjoining property when the zoning ordinance permitted
his intended purpose of building a tourist camp. Some work toward
developing the camp was done immediately upon obtaining the lease.
After applying for the proper permit and having it approved by the
City Board, but before actually receiving it because of technical difficulties,9 the defendant proceeded to expend more money and work
on the project. Although he was then notified that a rezoning of the
area was to be considered and that he should await the final outcome,
the defendant continued his work, and after the area had been rezoned
to a residential district he completed the project, most of the work
having been done after the area was rezoned. The defendant then
claimed that he had a vested right of which he could not be deprived
and so should be allowed to continue operations as a non-conforming
user. By a four to three decision the Supreme Court of Nebraska
affirmed the issuance of an injunction against such operation. 10
This problem of rights becoming vested before zoning or rezoning
may be divided into three main categories: where, prior to zoning,
(I) there is an existing permissive use, (2) the owner is in the act of
constructing a permissive use, or (3) the owner contemplates and has
acquired the property with the intention of putting it to a permissive use.
In the first category the general rule of law is that a subsequent
ordinance rezoning the district cannot be applied retroactively so as
to deprive a person of his vested right acquired in a formerly permissive use.'1 In deference to this rule, courts will ordinarily allow a
formerly permissive use to continue as a non-conforming use, particularly if its nature is such that its interference with the new restriction is negligible.1 2 However, the nature or character of the existing
'The request for a permit was granted by the city council but made subject
to the approval of the city's building department so that the actual plans would
conform with the technical building regulations of the city. This authorized permit
was never issued, for when the plans were presented the inspector refused to accept
them because a petition for reconsideration has been presented in the meantime.
1
It should be noted that the dissent made no mention of the vested rights
issue, but based its opinion on the ordinance itself being arbitrary and unreasonable. In stating that zoning ordinances are in derogation of the common law
and should be strictly construed, the dissent conformed to the minority view of
confining rather than broadening the zoning power.
uReynolds v. McArthur, 2 Pet 417, 7 L. ed. 470 (U. S. 1829); Baker v. Somer-

ville, 138 Neb. 466, 293 N. W 326 (194o); Cassel Realty Co. v. City of Omaha, 144
Neb. 753, 14 N. W (2d) 6oo (1944); 43 C. J., Municipal Corp. § 37o; U. S. Const.
Amend. 14 (deprivation of property without due process).
3 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d ed. 1943) § io46. An example of
this would be a two family house that existed in an area rezoned to one family
dwellings.
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use may give rise to exceptions to this general rule. Occasionally, if
the use is causing a harm of an uncertain or intangible nature but
its removal is deemed best for the public health and welfare, then the
owner may be compelled to discontinue his business.13 Thus, where a
drug or grocery store has existed in an area that is subsequently made
first class residential, its continued operation might be allowed or a
year or two to enable a more equitable liquidation. 14 If the use is
considered harmful and would amount to some type of nuisance, its
continued operation may be immediately prohibited.15 Thus, where
an owner had been operating a brickyard in an area originally outside of the city limits, and this area was later incorporated and zoned
residential, he was no longer permitted to manufacture bricks at that
site even though such prohibitions entailed the abandonment of his
business. 16
These situations indicate that a zoning ordinance validly can be
made to act retrospectively. In fact, it would seem that with respect to
the use of property that has already been purchased, all zoning is
retroactive to some degree in that it prevents unrestricted use of the
land which was open to the owner when he acquired it. Although
a zoning ordinance is almost always interpreted as being prospective
only, it may sometimes be specifically enacted by the legislature to be
retroactive and when it is so enacted it has a good chance of being
upheld because the courts are prone to rely on the discretion of the
7
legislature.1
In the principal case defendant evidently attempted to claim a
vested right under the second category, wherein property is in the
process of being developed and a subsequent rezoning makes such a
use non-conformable. The primary consideration in this field is the
amount of work that has been done and the liabilities incurred before
the zoning or rezoning.i s Here, too, the nature of the use being developed will be an underlying consideration. Most courts will be
less prone to assent to the prohibition if the development is of a use
"City of New Orleans v. Liberty Shop, Ltd., 157 La. 26, io So. 798 (1924).
"'See State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613, 614
(1929); State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314, 315 (1929).
sRemman v. Little Rock, 237 U. S. 171, 35 S. Ct. 511, 59 L. ed. 9oo (1915).
"Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394, 36 S. Ct. 143, 6o L. ed. 348 (1915).
1
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394, 36 S. Ct. 143, 6o L. ed. 348 (1915);
Eggebeen v. Sonnenberg, 239 Wis. 213, i N. W (2d) 84, 138 A. L. R. 495 (1941);
3 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d ed. 1943) 419.
21rrans-Oceanic Oil Corporation v. City of Santa Barbara, 85 Cal. App. (2d)
776, 194 P. (2d) 148 (1948); Pelham View Apartments v. Switzer, 130 Misc. 545,
224 N. Y. Supp. 56 (1927); 9 Am. Jur., Buildings § 8; Bassett, Zoning (1948) 178.

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

192

[Vol. VII

that is inherent to the particular site, such as drilling for oil or digging
gravel 19 whereas they might not have such compunctions if the use is
20
one that can be carried on as easily elsewhere, such as manufacturing.
However, this inherent quality of the use is not such a prime consideration that it will invalidate the ordinance if the use is deemed
21
noxious to the health or safety of the public.
The defendant's claim in the Glissman case is not well substantiated by the facts, and the court found that defendant "had not established any vested right to use these premises for the purpose here
contended when the change was made." 22 If the case had been before
a court that is inclined to be more liberal with the property owner,
the defendant might have prevailed, for he had expended time and
money in investigating other camps, and had expended labor and
money in clearing the site of the camp. Actually, defendant's permit
was originally granted by the city, but issuance was delayed for the
technical approval of the building department and this delay caused
it to be withheld pending the rezoning hearing. However, the fact
cannot be overlooked that the defendant did most of the work after
the ordinance was changed and without securing a permit.
It would seem by the court's decision that the principal case
comes more nearly within the purview of the third category, wherein
an owner contemplates or intends the development of a use that
becomes non-conformable by a change in zoning. The rule here is
that the mere acquiring of property for a certain use or the intention
of developing one's property for a certain use will not give the owner
a vested right of which he cannot be deprived by a subsequent ordinance.2 3 An example is West Bros. Brick Co., Inc. v. City of Alexandria2 4 where the owner, a brick maker, paid a considerable sum for a
tract of land because of its underlying clay deposits with the intention
of using it in the future. After a number of years had elapsed but before
digging was begun, the zoning classification was changed. In affirming
an injunction restraining the owner from digging the clay, the court
"iVillage of Terrace Park v. Errett, 12 F. (2d) 240 (C. C. A. 6th, 1a6); Ex parte
Kelso, 147 Cal. 6o9, 82 Pac. 241 (19o5); Trans-Oceanic Oil Corporation v. City of
Santa Barbara, 85 Cal. App. (2d) 776, 194 P (2d) 148 (1948).
2OHadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394, 36 S. Ct. 143, 6o L. ed. 348 (1915);
Village of Terrace Park v. Errett, 12 F. (2d) 240, 243 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926).

nSee Trans-Oceanic Oil Corporation v. City of Santa Barbara, 85 Cal. App. (2d)
776, 194 P

(2d) 148, 156 (1948).

N. W (2d) 828, 834 (Neb. 1949).
2Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 47 F. (2d) 528 (C. C. A. 9th,
1931); Osborn v. Town of Darien, 119 Conn. 182, 175 Atl. 578 (1934); West Bros.
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said, "It was bought, as we are told, for future use, and not having
been used at all, the doctrine of non-conforming uses has no appli25
cation."
The only consideration that may be classified as a main one in
this category is the reasonableness of the ordinance itself. The courts
hold that there is no problem of an ordinance having a retroactive
effect, for a mere intention does not make the use a reality, and, therefore, cannot give a vested right.
In perspective, it would seem that vested rights are not as inviolable as first appearances might lead one to believe. Actually, they are
always subject to the police power, one writer stating that "it is not
entirely clear how anyone can perfect a vested right against a police
power regulation. '26 It is held that a person cannot be deprived of
a vested right arbitrarily, but here "arbitrary" evidently bears the
connotation that the enactment of the ordinance is unreasonable only
if a certain lack of overall public benefit makes it so. Since it is said
that zoning looks to the future and concerns itself with future conditions more than with present ones, it would seem that this would
influence the courts in not regarding an individual's past or established property rights in such a sacred light as they formerly were.
As urban life increases in complexity, it is obvious that zoning authority must expand accordingly, for the necessity of increased protection must be met. However, the development of the trend of allowing a broad zoning power should not be allowed to go to such an
extent that the basic concept of individual ownership will be ignored.
JAcK E. GREit

COURTS-VALIDITY

OF

CRIMINAL TRIALS.

ORDER

OF

JUDGE

EXCLUDING

PUBLIC

FROM

[Federal]

An order by the judge conducting a criminal trial directing the
exclusion of orderly spectators is difficult to reconcile with the absolute guarantee of a public trial found in the Sixth Amendment of
2West Bros. Brick Co., Inc. v. City of Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 284, 192 S. E.
881, 11
886 (1937).
B assett, Zoning (1948) 178. This is given a fuller explanation on page 112

where the author states, "If the police power can be invoked to prevent a new
nonconforming building because of its relation to the community health . and
general welfare, it follows that the police power can be invoked to oust existing
nonconforming uses. Theoretically the police power is broad enough to warrant
the ousting of every nonconforming use, but the courts would rightly and sensibly
find a method of preventing such a catastrophe."
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2
the Federal Constitution' and in the constitutions of most states.
The problem is squarely presented to the appellate court when the
trial judge has made, over the objection of the defendant, a sweeping
order clearing from the courtroom members of the general public,
allowing only the defendant, officers of the court, witnesses, and one
or more other limited groups to remain. 3 Such action has not been
uncommon in criminal trials involving, by their nature, the revelation
of human depravity.
Demonstrating the occurrence of this problem is the recent case
of Unzted States v. Kobli,4 in which the defendants were charged
with violation of the Mann Act 5 and conspiracy to violate that Act.
On the day the trial was to begin, the courtroom was filled to overflowing with spectators, among them a great many young girls. Over

1U. S. Const. Amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the rsght to a speedy and public trial
" The Sixth Amendment is not
applicable to trsals sn state courts. See Gaines v. Washington, 277 U. S. 81, 85,
48 S. Ct. 468, 469, 72 L. ed. 793, 795 (1928). It is not thought that the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would make the public trial provision
applicable to trials in state courts. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 323,
58 S. Ct. 149, 151, 82 L. ed. 288, 291 (1937).
2
A compilation of state constitutional and statutory provisions requiring public
trial in criminal prosecutions is set forth in connection with Justice Black's opinion.
In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 268, 68 S.Ct. 499, 505, 92 L. ed. 682, 691 (1948). Forty-one
states have constitutional provisions; two states have statutory provisions. A few
states, however, have limited constitutional provisions and expressly allow exclusion
in certain cases. See, e.g., Miss. Const. (1942) § 26 (in prosecutions for rape, adultery,
fornication, sodomy or crime against nature all except those "necessary in the
conduct of the trial" may be excluded). For an interesting exception in state
statutes dealing with public trial, see Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 19-219. "In
the trial of all criminal cases, whether the same be felony or misdemeanor cases,
the court may, in its discretion, exclude from the trial any or all persons whose
presence is not deemed necessary." For a thorough study of the general problem,
see Note (1949) 49 Col. L. Rev. 11o.
3
The precise wording of the exclusion order differs in each individual case.
Among the groups allowed to remain are "all persons directly interested in the
case," Robertson v. State, 64 Fla. 437, 60 So. 118, 119 (1912); "students at law,"
Benedict v. People, 23 Cal. 126, 46 Pac. 637, 638 (1896); "those having business
with and in the court," People v. Byrnes, igo P (2d) 290, 291 (Cal. App. 1948);
"reporters of the public press, friends of the defendant, and persons necessary for
her to have on said trial," People v. Kerrigan, 73 Cal. 222, 14 Pac. 849, 85o (1887)In State v. Johnson, 26 Idaho 6o9, 144 Pac. 784, 785 (1914) an order excluding all
spectators was upheld, but the opinion states that "friends of the defendant who
desired to be present" and "officers of the court, including members of the bar,"
should not be excluded in such cases. In the usual exclusion order, named relatives
of the defendant or "persons directly interested in the case" or "friends of the
defendant" almost inevitably form one of the excepted groups. See, however,
Grimmett v. State, 22 Tex. Crim. Rep. 36, 2 S. W 631 (1886) where only officers,
jurors and counsel were allowed to remain.
'172 F (2d) 919 (C. A. 3d, 1949).
562 Stat. 812 (1948), 18 U. S. C. A. 2421 (Supp. 1949).
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the objection of defendant Kobli,6 the trial judge directed that the
courtroom be cleared of all people except "the defendants, their
counsel, witnesses and members of the press." Shortly thereafter the
trial judge offered to allow the readmission of any of the excluded
persons having a connection with the case whom the defendants
wished to be present. However, the record revealed nothing to indicate
that the exclusion order was later modified or rescinded.
The accused was convicted, but on appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, the judgment of the district court
was reversed and the cause was remanded for a new trial. It was held
that such an order applicable to the public generally denied the
objecting defendant the public trial to which she was entitled under
the Sixth Amendment. The trial judge's order of exclusion should
have been limited to those members of the public for whom space
was not available in the courtroom or whose conduct was such as to
interfere with the administration of justice, or those minors who in
the interest of public morals ought not to have been permitted to
hear the expected testimony. The decision was in accord with the
views of two other federal appellate courts which have passed upon
7
the precise question.
Where substantially the same problem has. faced the state courts,
there is disagreement as to the scope of protection afforded by the
right of public trial which springs from a controversy as to the essential nature and the historical basis of the guarantee. In courts where
the right to a public trial has been highly regarded and zealously
guarded, it has been determined that a violation necessarily implies
prejudice, and the defendant need not point out any definite injury.8
OThe better rule is that the technical failure to object to order at the proper
time does not constitute a waiver. Wade v. State, 207 Ala. 1, 92 So. iol (192);
State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio, St. 255, 79 N. E. 462 (i9o6); State v. Marsh, 126 Wash.
142, 217 Pac. 705 (1923). Contra: Keddington v. State, 19 Ariz. 457, 172 Pac. 273
(igi8); Benedict v. People, 26 Colo. 126, 46 Pac. 637 (1896). It has been suggested
that where the accused affirmatively requests the exclusion, he should not be
permitted to appeal from an adverse decision on the grounds of deprivation of
public trial. However, intelligent waiver by the accused should be allowed since
the community's interest is protected by the need for agreement to the waiver by
the public prosecutor and judge. See Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 312, 50
S. Ct. 253, 263, 74 L. ed. 855, 870 (1930). Note (1949) 44 Col. L. Rev. 1io.
7Davis v. United States, 247 Fed. 384 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917); Tanksley v. United
States, 145 F. (2d) 58 (C. C. A. 9th, 1944).
"Despite some state decisions to the contrary, this seems to be the prevailing
and better state and federal view. Davis v. United States, 247 Fed. 394 (C. C. A.
8th, 1917); Tanksley v. United States, 145 F. (2d) 58 (C. C. A. 9th, 1944); People
v. Yeager, 113 Mich. 228, 7 N. W 491 (1897); State v. Beckstead, 96 Utah 528, 88
P (2d) 461 (1939). Contra: Reagan v. United States, 202 Fed. 488 (C. C. A. 9th, 1913).
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While respectable authority has stated that "the requirement of a
public trial is for the benefit of the accused," 9 it seems more accurate
in the light of historical perspective to say that the guarantee of a
public trial is of a dual nature, of benefit to both the general public
and the accused. It is generally conceded that the common law concept of a public trial had, at the time the Constitution was framed,
come to be regarded as an essential assurance against any attempt to
employ the courts as instruments of persecutionO and as a vital
means of facilitating the administration of justice. 1
The right to public trial has been held subject to some practical
limitations by all courts. Any individual whose conduct tends to
interfere with the administration of justice may, of course, be removed.12 In the extraordinary event that the entire group of spectators
OAn unfortunate statement from the ambiguous, often quoted, and misunderstood passage from i Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed. 1927) 647. "The
requirement of a public trial is for the benefit of the accused, that the public
may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence
of interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the importance of their functions; and the requirement is fairly
observed, if, without partiality or favoritism, a reasonable proportion of the public
is suffered to attend, notwithstanding that those persons whose presence would be
of no service to the accused, and who would only be drawn thither by a prurient
curiosity, are excluded altogether." This particular passage has furnished the basis
for decisions upholding exclusion orders. Robertson v. State, 64 Fla. 437, 6o So.
118 (1912); State v. Johnson, 26 Idaho 6og, 144 Pac. 784 (1914); Grsmmett v. State,
22 Tex. Crim. 36, 2 S. W 631 (1886); and, also, the passage has been quoted in
decisions holding similar exclusion orders invalid. State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio St.
255, 79 N. E. 462 (19o6); State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 Pac. 480 (1928).
1
0"Whatever other benefits the guarantee to an accused that his trial be conducted in public may confer upon our society, the guarantee has always been
recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments
of persecution." In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 270, 68 S. Ct. 499, 505, 92 L. ed. 682,
692 (1948). But see, Radin, The Right to a Public Trial (1932) 6 Temp. L. Q. 381,
who attributes the origin of the American public trial provision to a "fortuitous
circumstance" that the jury trial system in England involved a large panel, thereby
insuring the presence of a substantial part of the public.
"Public trials were thought to produce circumstances under which witnesses
were less likely to perjure themselves. Tanksley v. United States, 145 F. (2d) 58
(C. C. A. 9th, 1944). Public trials might attract important witnesses unknown to
the parties who might voluntarily come forward to testify. It was also thought that
the conduct of trials in public would enable the spectators to learn about their
government and acquire confidence in their judicial remedies. 6 Wigmore, Evidence
(3d ed. 1940) § 1834. Since truthful witnesses and unknown witnesses who present
themselves are quite as likely to aid the prosecution as the defendant, it is impossible
to support Cooley's contention that the requirement of a public trial is necessarily
for the benefit of the accused. It seems correct to speak of it only as a means of
facilitating the administration of justice, whatever justice may be, and not as
a benefit to either the prosecution or the accused.
"State v. Genese, io2 N. J. L. 134, 13o Atl. 642 (1925) (individuals excluded
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becomes disorderly, the trial judge may order their exclusion.iS He
may also take steps to prevent armed men from attending a trial.14
The right does not require that the trial be held in a place large
enough to accommodate all those who desire to attend. 15 Nor does
complete exclusion of the public for a temporary period constitute
a deprival of a public trial when it is the only means of securing
testimony from a youthful witness.' 6 Likewise, as stated in the Kobli
case, "there is agreement that in cases involving sexual offenses youthful spectators may be excluded when the evidence is likely to involve
the recital of scandalous or indecent matters which would have a
17
demoralizing effect upon their immature minds."'
It is quite a different matter to carry these practical limitations
to their ultimate extreme of complete exclusion of the orderly, nonpartisan spectator. However, a small minority of state courts have
upheld such exclusion orders, with minor exceptions such as those
made by the trial judge in the Kobli case, in the face of state constitutional provisions as unqualified and unlimited as that included in
the Sixth Amendment. The unsatisfactory nature of these decisions is
reflected in the curious course of reasoning employed.
While it seems logical to hold that a public trial is "a trial at
which the public is free to attend,"Is the Florida Supreme Court in
Robertson v. State'0 utilized a definition found in the dictum of an
early, now disregarded California case 20 to the effect that the word
because they persisted in laughing). In Davis v. United States, 247 Fed. 394, 395
(C. C. A. 8th, 1917) the following statement was made: "An intoxicated man could
have been excluded or removed; the aisles and passageways could have been kept
dear; when the seats were filled, other spectators could have been denied at the
door; if the noise in the lobbies interfered with the proceedings, the lobbies could
have been cleared; and individuals whose conduct outside the courtroom made
their presence within a menace might have been excluded."
1SLide v. State, 133 Ala. 43, 31 So. 953 (igo2). It is extremely unlikely that
the entire group of spectators should become disorderly.
1
'People v. Mangiapane, 2i9 Mich. 62, 188 N. W 401 (1922). For elaborate
precautions which may be taken to preserve order and to protect the court from a
notorious criminal, see Pierpont v. State, 49 Ohio App. 77, 195 N. E. 264 (1934).
"Davis v. Umted States, 247 Fed. 394, 395 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917); Myers v. State,
97 Ga. 76, 25 S. E. 252, 26o (1895).
"Hogan v. State, igi Ark. 437, 86 S. W (2d) 931 (1935); State v. Damm, 62 S. D.
123, 252 N. W. 7 (1933).
17172 F. (2d) 919, 922 (C. A. 3 d, 1949). See State v. Adams, ioo S. C. 43, 84 S. E.
368 (igi5). Statutes provide for exclusion of minors in four states. Ariz. Code Ann.
(1939) § 21-904; Mich. Comp. Laws (Mason, 1929) § 13887; Minn. Stat. (Henderson,
1945)2 § 631.04; Nev. Comp. Laws Ann. (1929) § 8404.
Davis v. United States, 247 Fed. 394, 395 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917).
1164 Fla. 437, 60 So. I'8 (1912).
2°People v. Swafford, 65 Cal. 223, 3 Pac. 8o9 (1884). Cf. People v. Byrnes, 19o
P. (2d) 290 (Cal. App. 1948).
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"public" as used in the public trial provision of the California Constitution is in opposition to the word "secret." In Keddington v.
State,21 the Arizona Supreme Court turned to a similar definition
in holding a public trial to be "the opposite of a secret trial or a trial
in camera or at star chambers." 22 By thus defining "public trial" in
negative terms, the first step toward circumvention of the unqualified
constitutional guarantee was completed.
Noting that the word "public" was all-embracing and that it
would be quite impossible for the entire public to attend a trial, the
minority courts logically deduced that the word was subject to a
practical limitation in degree. The Roberston decision termed a
"public trial" as one where "a reasonable proportion of the public" 23
was allowed to attend. Referring to those who were allowed to remain
in the courtroom as the necessary parties to a trial and as those
"directly interested in the case," 24 the court found that a "reasonable
portion of the public" was present. To strengthen the action of
the trial judge in excluding all spectators, the court by implication
branded all spectators except those "directly interested," as "drawn
thither by a prurient curiosity. ' 25
The Keddington case developed a more original approach to the
problem. Noting that the courtroom need not be large enough to
accommodate all who wish to attend a criminal trial, the court
could proceed further- "Some of the public not actually engaged in
the trial must be privileged or allowed to attend the trial to constitute
it public, but no irreducible minimum has ever been proposed or
'26
named as yet."

Observing that modern stenographic records and the wide public
distribution of news of judicial oppression through newspapers afforded
the defendant protection from prejudice in lower courts, the Keddington case held that if members of the press were present during
the trial, there was a "public trial." Thus, the Arizona court turned
the responsibility of directing public attention to acts of judicial
oppression to those whom the Kobli decision referred to as "the more
seasoned but sometimes blas6 professional gatherer of news." 27 If
rationalizations of the minority courts are directed toward the protection of public morals through exclusion of adult spectators, this
Ariz. 457, -72 Pac. 273, 274 (1918).
Keddington v. State, i9 Ariz. 457, 172 Pac. 273, 274 (1918).
2364 Fla. 437, 60 So. ni8, 119 (1912).
24Robertson v. State, 64 Fla. 437, 6o So. 118, 119 (1912).
2
Robertson v. State, 64 Fla. 437, 6o So. 118, ng (1912).
2e19 Ariz. 457, 172 Pac. 273, 274 (1918) [italics supplied].
2United States v. Kobli, 172 F. (2d) 919, 923 (C. A. 3d, 1949).
2'i9
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is done with disregard to what the Kobli case terms "the franker and
more realistic attitude [which] precludes a determination that all
members of the public, the mature and experienced as well as the
immature and impressionable, may reasonably be excluded from the
'28
trial of a sexual offense upon the grounds of public morals.
The assumption that there is no danger from judicial oppression,
certainly an unwise one in the light of modern history, and a misapprehension of the dual nature of the right to public trial appear to
have led the minority courts astray. In the Keddington case, the public
right was irresponsibly delegated to the press representatives; in the
Robertson case there was complete identification of the public's interest with that of the "directly interested" group-almost inevitably
a partisan group.
There are obvious practical difficulties in limiting exclusion
orders to certain designated classes. It is often difficult to find the
source of disorder in a courtroom. And, too, it is impossible to determine at times which youthful spectators should be excluded because
of potential damage to public morals. But these are practical considerations wisely left in the discretion of the judge; and in carefully making his exclusion order in a form which limits it to groups
or individuals who may be rightfully excluded, he may facilitate the
administration of justice while yet protecting the valuable right to a
public trial. Mere absence of judicial oppression in any given case does
not decrease the value of a constitutional guarantee designed in part to
guard against such oppression.29 It is evidence only of a high decree
of public morality which has made unnecessary the invoking of the
protection in that case.
The public and the accused both have significant interests in
the constitutional guarantee which are, however, based on different
considerations: the public has the general, long-range concern that
the administration of criminal prosecutions proceed according to
standards which a democratic society thinks will bring justice in the
29172 F. (2d) 919, 923 (C.A. 3d, 1949). In Ex Parte Wade, 207 Ala. 241, 92 So.
104, 105 (1922) it was suggested that a definite choice had been made: "Evidently
the framers of the Constitution conceived that the necessity for the 'public trials'
required by the organic law
was more important, more vital to the welfare
and to the safety of the people of the state, than the possibility or probability
that, upon occasions... morals might be shocked or impaired through the voluntary
attendance of the idle and morbidly curious upon 'public trials' where matters
of a salacious character were involved."
nSome courts, however, do not regard the right to public trial as logical. Note,
for example, the statement in the principal case: "While as has been suggested, the
right thus accorded to members of the public as mere spectators may not be
wholly logical
" United States v. Kobli, 172 F. (2d) 919,, 924 (C. A. d, 1949).
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greater number of cases, while the accused has the specific, immediate
concern in having his case presented in the most favorable light for
securing an acquittal. Recognition of the existence of both of these
divergent interests by the courts would have precluded much of the
confusion which has beset the subject.
H. CIG CASTLE

EMINENT

DOMAIN-EVALUATION

BY GOVERNMENT

UNDER WAR

OF

MERCHANT

EMERGENCY

SHIPS

REQUISITIONED

POWERS.

[United States

Supreme Court]
As an outgrowth of the wartime shipping emergency, the problem
of evaluating merchant vessels requisitioned for title or charter by
the government is again facing the courts. Because of the nature of
the property, the complexity of the factors on which its value depends,
and the fluctuating conditions of the industry generally, ordinary rules
of evaluation for damages purposes do not provide satisfactory results.
At the conclusion of the first World War in 1918, through continuation of the wartime building program, the American government
had in its possession by 1922 a vast surplusage of ships beyond this
country's ordinary peacetime needs. Because the government adopted
a restrictive pricing policy in regard to the sale of these ships, costs
to buyers became excessive. The foreign shipbuilding yards were
soon rehabilitated and produced ships at lower costs than was possible in the United States. The result was that the government lost
money, the shipping operators (especially those purchasing prior to
the collapse of the market) were ruined, and the American merchant
marine was seriously crippled. By 1935, American merchant shipping
had reached such a condition that it imperiled the national defense
due to its age, lack of numbers, and the demoralization of employeremployee relations.'
In 1936, the first really comprehensive merchant marine act in
the Nation's history was passed, it purpose being stated as follows:
"It is necessary for the national defense and development
of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United States
shall have a merchant marine (a) sufficient to carry its domestic
water-borne commerce and a substantial portion of the waterborne export and import foreign commerce of the United
"See pages 18-21, 32, 44, Merchant Marine for Trade and Defense, United
States Maritime Commission, Washington (1946). Revised, 1949. United States
Government Printing Office.
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States and to provide shipping service on all routes essential
for maintaining the flow of such domestic and foreign waterborne commerce at all times, (b) capable of serving as a naval
and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency,
(c) owned and operated under the United States flag by citizens
of the United States insofar as may be practicable, and (d)
composed of the best-equipped, safest, and most suitable types
of vessels, constructed in the United States and manned with a
trained and efficient citizen personnel. It is hereby declared to
be the policy of the United States to foster the development'2
and encourage the maintenance of such a merchant marine."
The Act set up the present Maritime Commission which was to
administer the provisions of the Act and become the general steward
for all maritime matters in the United States.
4
Certain titles provided for "construction-differential" subsidies,
and "operating-differential" subsidies, 5 and gave power to the Maritime Commission to construct ships for its own account. 6 Under a
1939 amendment,7 the Commission is given power, in the event of
the proclamation of a national emergency by the President, to requisition for charter, hire, or title any vessel owned by an American
citizen or which is being constructed in an American shipyard. For
such vessels the Commission is obligated to pay "just compensation,"
and if the party objects to the evaluation set by the Commission, it
may elect to take seventy-five per cent of the predetermined amount
and sue for the balance it believes is due.8 The difficulty ihich immediately presents itself is the determination in each particular case
of what is "just compensation."
The recent case of United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo
Navigation Co.9 involved an action by the company against the United
States in the Court of Claims to recover just compensation in the
amount of $711,753 for a Great Lakes car ferry requisitioned by the
"49 Stat. 1985 (1936), 46 U. S. C. §iioi (1946) [italics supplied].
349 Stat. 1985 (1936), 46 U. S. C. § 111 (1946), as amended 63 Stat. 880 (1949).
449 Stat. 1995 (1936), 46 U. S. C. §§ 1151-1161 (1946). "In 1937 there were
only io shipyards in the country, employing 6o,ooo workers, which were capable
of building 400-foot oceangoing vessels." Page 45, Merchant Marine for Trade and
Defense, United States Maritime Commission, Washington (1946). Revised, 1949.
United States Government Printing Office.
549 Stat. 2001 (1936), 46 U. S. C. §§ 1171-1182 (1946). See pages 4-16, Economic
Survey of the American Merchant Marine, United States Maritime Commission,
Nov. io, 1937. United States Government Printing Office, Washington (1937).
649 Stat. 2oo8 (1936), 46 U. S. C. §§ i191-1204 (1946).
7Tit. IX, § 902; 53 Stat. 1255 (1939), amended 57 Stat. 49 (1943), 46 U. S. C.
§ 1242 (1946).
853 Stat. 1255 (1939), amended 57 Stat. 49 (1943), 46 U. S. C. § 1242 (1946).
9338 U. S. 396, 70 S. Ct. 217, 94 L. ed. 162 (1949).
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War Shipping Administration in 1942. The government, pursuant
to the statute, 10 fixed the vessel's value at $72,5oo and tendered that
amount. In 1943, the company exercised its statutory option and
accepted 75% of that figure because it was dissatisfied with the total
offered and desired to bring suit for what it considered the fair value.
The Court of Claims declared the full value of the ship to be
$i61,833.72."1

The vessel had originally been a railroad ferry built in 1916,
but its use had been abandoned as such since 1932. It could have
been easily converted for use as an automobile ferry. 12 It had been
acquired at a cost of nearly $400,000 to the company, substantial

additions had been made, and the earnings had never been sufficient
to offset the total initial cost, plus cost of operation and maintenance,
plus replacement of a similar vessel or replacement of the original
capital when the life of the vessel expired. Thus, unless a substantial
sum above that amount allowed by the government could be recovered, the company would suffer a serious depletion of its capital
account, unless, contrary to the experience of almost the entire industry, it had been able to maintain a sufficiently high level of cash
reserves between 1928 and 1938 so as to be able to finance replacement.'

3

'053 Stat. 1255 (1939), amended 57 Stat. 49 (1943), 46 U. S. C. § 1242 (1946).
"The Court of Claims (81 F. Supp. 244), finding that 'the property condemned' was 'unique,
peculiarly situated' and without relative comparison on
the Great Lakes, concluded that the Maitland was worth more than 'the residual
value of an obsolete car ferry,' thus requiring resort to 'a consideration of the
earnings
, in conjunction with the contemporaneous transaction in vessels of
close similarity in determining a fair value.' It called 'the average mean residual
value of an obsolete car ferry' $50,000; 'attributing this value to the Maitland,'

the captialized value of an annual income comparable to that of the Maitland for
the sixteen years ending in 1932 was the figure of $389,767.15, 'according to actuarial
tables in evidence.' The court then deducted the percentage difference between
the life expectancy of the vessel in fresh and salt water (20%/), the cost of conversion to salt water and sailing it to Florida, and the necessary repairs. Under
this formula, $161,833.72 was the fair value for 'its highest available and most
profitable use for which it was adaptable at the time of its taking.' " United
States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Nay. Co., 338 U. S. 396, 70 S. Ct. 217, 221, 94
L. ed. 162, 165 (1949)"-The Court points out that there had been sales for this purpose between
1936 and 1940 which ranged from $25,000 to $65,ooo for vessels not in as good a
state of repair as the Maitland. United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Nay.
Co., 338 U. S. 396, 70 S. Ct. 217, 220, 94 L. ed. 162, 165 (1949).
"Frequently, in a large fixed capital industry, many capital assets which are
still of great worth have been depreciated to the point where they have no book
value, but they may (usually) or may not have any actual worth. If the company
is able to replace out of cash reserves maintained as depreciation was taken, it
suffers no capital depletion, either real or through loss of earning capacity; this
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The Supreme Court, in remanding the case to the Court of Claims,
assigned as the two principal causes of error of that court the capitalization of the ship's earnings previous to 1932 to reach an evaluation
figure, and the consideration given to possible prices that would be
paid on the Florida market for a similar ship if anyone would buy it
if it were there.
The courts in this case have given consideration to the several
factors which are normally applied to the evaluation of individual
merchant vessels, but the principal problem is whether those factors
will give a fair "value" consonant with the intent of the maritime
policy of the United States as expressed in various statutes.
The first factor mentioned by Justice Clark is that of original
building cost. This is obviously out of line with present costs due to
the fact that the vessel was constructed some thirty years previous to
the institution of this suit. Labor and materials costs have completely
changed as have methods of vessel construction. To equate such costs
to those of today would be a tenuous and unsatisfactory procedure at
best, with uniformly poor results.14 The cost to the company here
had been $394,56o.
The insured valuation of the vessel is a sounder basis. It may
prove unsatisfactory due to a policy of not insuring up to full value
(the usual practice) because of excessive cost of the insurance or the
unwillingness of the insurance companies to do so. However, it does
have some reasonable relation to the issue in that it gives some indication of what the company thinks its own ship is worth. The insured
valuation of the vessel here was $1oo,ooo in 1942.
Consideration of the scrap value of a vessel, even though such
vessel has little utility value immediately, especially when the vessel
is not true in the shipping industry due to the lack 'of large cash reserves by nearly
all of the shipping companies. See page 28, Economic Survey of the American Merchant Marine, United States Maritime Commission, Nov. io, 1937. United States
Government Printing Office, Washington (1937). Also see the Annual Reports to
Congress of the United States Maritime Commission which for the last five years
have shown a steady decrease in the amount of cash and U. S. Government securities
on deposit in the statutory capital and special reserve funds of the subsidized
operators. This has been due largely to the "recapture" provisions of the Act
of 1936 and not due to any acquiring of ships. The total reserve stood at about
$86,ooo,ooo on June 3o, 1949. Though the reserves of the private operators are
currently at a high level due to the earnings of the last ten years, these two
sources are still inadequate to provide for constant replacement of our over-age

vessels.
ItThe original cost of this vessel is a "false standard of the past" where the
present market value does not reflect that cost in any way. United States v. Toronto,
Hamilton & Buffalo Nay. Co., 338 U. S. 396, 70 S. Ct. 217, 220, 94 L. ed. 162,
i66 (1949), footnote 4.
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is of sizeable tonnage, would seem directly to contravene the policy
of the Merchant Marine Act. If shipping companies are only to be
given scrap value for vessels requisitioned by the government 15 or
traded in to the government, 16 It Is to be expected that there will
be little replacement of the present merchant marine; the shipping
companies simply do not have the resources. 17 The scrap value of the
vessel was $13,500.

Probably the hardest factor to consider is that of earning, the
Court of Claims' handling of which the Supreme Court assigned as
error. The Court said at that point: "We see no relevance in the
Maitland's earnings between 1916 and i932 on the issue of capacity
to earn after 1942, on the Great Lakes or elsewhere. On this record
they are entirely too remote to bear on the vessel's value when
taken."' 8
Possibly, if the facts concerning earnings are taken as isolated
facts without remembering the overall purposes of the Merchant
Marine Act of i936,19 the Supreme Court was correct. However, the
courts, in making ship evaluation, should consider that one of the
purposes of that Act was to promote the continued life of American
shipping, and in doing so, much leeway must be given to the evalua20
tion of seemingly obsolete and useless vessels.
"Under 53 Stat. 1255 (1939), amended 57 Stat. 49 (1943), 46 U. S. C. §

1242 (1946).
"Under §§ 8-9 of the Ship Sales Act, 60 Stat. 45-49, 50 U. S. C. §§ 1741-1742
(1946).
'7 For the conditions prevalent in 1937, see pages 27-35, Economic Survey of
the American Merchant Marine, United States Maritime Commission, Nov. 10, 1937United States Government Printing Office, Washington (1937). For an example
of the present reluctance or inability of American companies to order new ships
note the following: "Foreign nations were far ahead of the United States in construction of new ships. Their i949 fleets were to be augmented by over i,ooo
vessels of approximately 7,500,000 gross tons under construction or on order in
foreign yards. By comparison, we had in this country on August 1, 1949, a total
of only about 55 new oceangoing vessels under construction or on order, and of
this total one-fourth were for foreign account." Page 2, Ships of the American
Merchant Marine, U. S. Maritime Commission, United States Government Printing
Office, Washington (195o).
"United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Nay. Co., 338 U. S. 396, 70
S. Ct. 217, 222, 94 L. ed. 162, 166 (1949).
"As set out in the preamble to the act, 49 Stat. 1985 (1936), 46 U. S. C. § iioi
(1946). See also amendments: 53 Stat. 1254 (1939), amended 57 Stat. 49 (1943), 46
U. S. C. §§ 1202, 1212 (1946)), and 6o Stat. 41, 50 U. S. C. §§ 1735-1746 (1946).
"Of course, when a ship has a "present earning capacity" of a substantial
nature, the evaluation process becomes vastly more simple; less emphasis must be
given to its intangible value as an essential portion of a fleet which the Government owes a duty by statute to develop because ordinary evaluation methods will
reach a more equitable result in view of the statute.
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The second ground of error and the final evaluation factor considered is that of market value. The Court of Claims, in arriving at
its evaluation of the vessel, found that there was no Great Lakes
market for this vessel; with this the Supreme Court agreed. However,
the lower court then proceeded to consider possible Florida demand
for a ship of the Maztland's type for use as an automobile ferry between Florida and Cuba. This the Supreme Court declared was error
due to the lack of evidence on the point, there having been but one
sale on the Great Lakes to a Florida buyer for Florida use, and that
one following the war. However, the Supreme Court in remanding
the case conceded that if the company, bearing the burden of the
proof, can show a Florida market for the vessel in 1942, such market
will be considered as a valid evaluation factor. It was expressly recognized that in property of this type, market value at the situs of the
property is not the only market value to be considered; all markets
21
reasonably available to the seller should also be relevant.
An examination of other evaluation cases decided since the institution of the 1936 Act brings a rather unsatisfactory conclusion as
to the status of the law on this subject. Almost all of the cases have
cited as authority Brooks-Scanlon v. Unzted States,2 2 decided twelve
years before the passage of the present Merchant Marine Act. That
case held that the Government's obligation to pay "just compensation"
for merchant vessels was the same as its obligation to pay "just compensation" under the Fifth Amendment. Possibly the 1936 Act adds
something more to the obligation of the government than is indicated in the ordinary evaluation case.
In one of the most oft-quoted passages in all of these cases, the
Supreme Court observed: "It [just compensation] is the sum which,
considering all the circumstances-uncertainties of the war and the
2
"But we do not think a similar rule practical or fair in the requisition of
property which most owners would, if possible, sell without geographic restriction. We doubt, for example, that owners of ocean liners would, under ordinary
circumstances, fail to negotiate beyond the port in which the vessels lay-whether
or not ocean liners are 'goods' and subject to the law of sales. Were market
conditions normal, we could hardly call an award 'just compensation' unless relevant foreign sales, in available markets, were considered." [Footnotes and cited
authority omitted.] United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co.,
338 U. S. 396, 7o S. Ct. 217, 222, 94 L. ed. 162, 167 (1949). It is to be noticed that
the Court, in the instant case, did not take up the matter that the circumstances
surrounding the taking should have no effect upon the value paid by the Government. 53 Stat. 1255 (1939), 46 U. S. C. § 1242 (1946). The most recent decision on
this point is United States v. Cors, 337 U. S. 325, 69 S. Ct. io86, 93 L. ed. 1392
(1949), which adjudication has left both private attorneys and those of the Government in complete confusion as to the law on this factor.
-65 U. S. 1o, 44 S. Ct. 471, 68 L. ed. 934 (1924).
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rest-probably could have been obtained ., that is, the sum that
would in all probability result from fair negotiations between an
23
owner who is willing to sell and a purchaser who desires to buy."
However, taking a cross section of the recent cases at random, it
is to be found that the government shipping agency, in the first
instance, and the courts, in the second instance, by applying this
standard of "just compensation" based on the ordinary factors considered in evaluating property have arrived at a value for most vessels
entirely inconsistent with the purposes of the 1936 Act and the subsequent amendments. 24 A shipping corporation, given little more
than scrap value for its property, cannot maintain a modern, efficient
fleet and adequate service over its assigned routes in the face of
investor reluctance 25 and low-cost foreign competition.
In ordinary suits between private parties to declare the value of
merchant vessels, it is undoubtedly quite proper to maintain the
ordinary factors constituting just compensation. But, where the government is obligated by statute to maintain and develop such a merchant marine as is described in Section ioi of Title 1,26 and is directed
by that same statute into such paternalistic measures as subsidies, it
would seem to be a fair proposition that the courts should not adhere
to a method of evaluation which experience shows has had a crippling
27
influence on the merchant marine.
'Brooks-Scanlon

Corporation v. United States, 265 U. S. io6, 123, 44 S. Ct.

471, 475, 68 L. ed. 934, 941 (1924).

'United States v. Cors, 337 U. S. 325, 69 S. Ct. io86, 93 L. ed. 1392 (1949);
United States v. Buxton Lines, 165 F. (2d) 993 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1948); Baltimore Steam
Packet Co. v. United States (Four cases), 81 F. Supp. 707, 711, 713, 715 (Ct. Cl. 1949);
Wilson Line v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 821 (Ct. Cl. 1948); Seven-Up Bottling
Co. of Los Angeles, Inc. v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 735 (Ct. Cl. 1946); Eastern
S. S. Lines, Inc. v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 37 (D. C. Mass. 1947). But see National
Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 622 (D. C. Del. 1947), wherein
the court used the market value and reached a reasonable solution with a vessel
approximately one year old.
'See page 35, Economic Survey of the American Merchant Marine, United
States Maritime Commission, United States Government Printing Office, Washington (1937).
i249 Stat. 1985
(1936), 46 U. S. C. § 11Ol (1946).
27In 1937 it was announced that the United States would embark upon a ten
year, five hundred ship building program to produce fifty new oceangoing ships
per year. The program finally got under way in 1939 and in the next two years
a total of 185 ships were built or enough to replace the total 1937 fleet at a rate
of 6% a year roughly. See pages 22-24, Merchant Marine for Trade and Defense,
United States Maritime Commission, Washington (1946), Revised 1949, United
States Government Printing Office; and also pages 26-27, Economic Survey of the
American Merchant Marine, United States Maritime Commission, Nov. io, 1937,
United States Government Printing Office, Washington (1937). It should be remembered that this replacement rate was under the impetus of a war demand and
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Many cases say that just compensation consists of putting an
owner in as good a position as he was previous to the taking of his
property. 28 Perhaps if this concept were to include a consideration of
the intangible value of a vessel, beyond its physical evaluation for
actual sale, by its being part of a fleet with which the government is
charged by statute to develop, it could be used as a standard of
20
departure.
A survey of the cases in this field leads to the conclusion that the
courts have not kept the tenor of the statute in mind. Courts have
historically accepted the job of so construing the individual portions
of a statute as best to effectuate the purposes either stated therein or
intended by the framers as shown by other evidence.30 In view of
the obligation with which the government is charged by statute, it
is recommended, that in ascertaining just compensation which must
be paid by the government, that obligation with which the government is charged should be considered as a separate and perhaps allpervading factor in the correct ascertainment of the value of an individual vessel. Evaluation of such a factor might include a consideration of the ability of the company to replace the vessel at present prices
emergency and did not reflect normal demand; that normal demand might be
more fairly indicated by the two year delay from 1937 to 1939.
nSeaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U. S. 299, 304, 43 S. Ct. 354, 356,
67 L. ed. 664, 669 (1923); Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 52 F. (2d) 372, 38, (C. C. A. 8th, i93i); Eastern S. S. Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 74 F Supp. 37, 38 (D. C. Mass. 1947).
-'This would be more than mere "utility" value and probably would need to
include a prohibition against "circumstances surrounding the taking." [53 Stat.
1255 (1939), amended 57 Stat. 49 (1943), 46 U. S. C. § 1242 (1946), and see United
States v. Cots, 337 U. S. 325, 69 S. Ct. io86, 93 L. ed. 1392 (1949)] such as the abnormal

demands caused by war, etc.
"Nothwithstanding their genius for the generation of new law from that
already established, the common law courts have given little recognition to statutes
as starting points for judicial lawmaking comparable to judicial decisions. They
have long recognized the supremacy of statutes over judge-made law, but it has
been the supremacy of a command to be obeyed according to its letter, to be
treated as otherwise of little consequence. The fact that the command involves
recognition of a policy by the supreme lawmaking body has seldom been regarded
by the courts as significant, either as social datum or as a point of departure for
the process of judicial reasoning by which the common law has been expanded."
"
I can find in the history and principles of the common law no adequate
reason for our failure to treat a statute much more as we treat a judicial precedent,
as both a declaration and a source of law, and as a premise for legal reasoning."
"' . It is difficult to appraise the consequences of the perpetuation of incongruities and injustices in the law by the habit of narrow construction of statutes
and by the failure to recognize that they are as significant as recognitions of social
needs and rightly as much a part of the law as the rules declared by judges."
Stone, The Common Law in the United States, taken from The Future of the
Common Law (1937) 131-3.
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in view of its present resources, the necessity for replacement in order
that the company may continue to carry its portion of the Nation's
commerce, the competitive position in which various alternative
amounts would leave the company both domestically and with regard
31
It
to foreign competitors, and many other similar considerations.
is submitted that only in this way will the true purpose of the
Merchant Marine Act be fulfilled.
ALVIN N. WVARTMAN

EVIDENCE-CONCLUSIVENESS

OF EVIDENCE OF EXCLUSIONARY RESULTS OF

BLOOD TESTS IN PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS.

[Maine]

Although many courts have overcome their reluctance to admit in
evidence in paternity proceedings the results of blood tests which
exclude an alleged father, there still remains a general failure to
recognize the conclusiveness of such tests.' Statutes which allow exclusionary results of blood tests to be admitted in evidence exist in
eight states, 2 similar in nature to the pioneer statute passed in New
York in i935. Courts in a number of other jurisdictions have, without
nAt least two concrete sets of "rules" upon which to fix lust compensation
have been established. The first of these was drafted by the Advisory Board on
Just Compensation established by authority of Executive Order 9387, 8 Fed. Reg.
14105, 3 Code Fed. Regs. 1943 Supp., which board consisted of Judges Learned
Hand, John J. Parker, and Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr. The second attempt is that
found in § 8 (b) of the Ship Sales Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 45, 50 U. S. C. § 1741
(b) (1946).
'Excellent references dealing with the scientific and legal aspects of blood test
exclusions are: Boyd, Protecting the Evidentiary Value of Blood Group Determinations (1943) 16 So. Calif. L. Rev. 193; Britt, Blood Grouping Tests and The Law:
The Problem of "Cultural Lag" (1937) 21 Minn. L. Rev. 671; Galton, Blood
Grouping Tests and Their Relationship to the Law (1938) 17 Ore. L. Rev. 177;
Maguire, A Survey of Blood Group Decisions and Legislation in the American
Law of Evidence (1943) i6 So. Calif. L. Rev. i6i; 1 Wigmore, Evidence (3 d ed.
1939) §§ 165 a, 165 b; see Note (1946) 163 A. L. R. 939.
2New York, N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 3o6 a (1935), N. Y. Domestic Relations Law
§ 126 (1935), N. Y. Crim. Code § 684 a (1938), Domestic Relations Act of the
City of New York § 34 (1942); Maine, Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 153 § 34; Maryland,
Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws (Flack, Supp. 1943) Art. 12 § 17; New Jersey, N. J.
Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1946) § 2: 99-3, 4; North Carolina, N. C. Gen. Stat. (Michie, et
al., Supp. 1945) § 49-7; Ohio, Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, Supp. 1946) § 12122-1, 2;
South Dakota, S. D. Code (1939) 36.o 6 o 2, Sup. Ct. Rule 540 (1939); Wisconsin, Wis.
Stat. (Brossard, 1943) § 166.105, 325.23; Mo. H. B. No. ii 9 § 8 Pending in Legislature.
Shatkin, Disputed Paternity Proceedings (2d ed. 1947) 183-2o6 [citations taken from
Note (1948) 34 Corn. L. Q. 721. Each statute has provisions requiring the parties
to submit to the tests at the request of the defendant, and allowing results which
show a definite exclusion to be admitted in evidence. However, none of the statutes
specify what shall be the weight in evidence of the tests.
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specific statutory authority, recognized the biological law relative to
the inheritance of blood groups and types, but with varying effect.
California is one state allowing blood test evidence in paternity
suits without legislative approval, but in practice the results of this
progressive judicial attitude have not been encouraging. In 1937, the
Supreme Court of that state rendered its opinion in the case of Arais
v. Kalensnikoff,3 a decision which aroused a storm of criticism from
legal writers. 4 The court, in holding that blood test results are entitled
to no greater weight than other expert testimony, declared: "Whatever
claims the medical profession may make for the tests, in California
'no evidence is by law made conclusive or unanswerable, unless so
declared by this code'. .. Expert testimony 'is to be given the weight
to which it appears in each case to be justly entitled' . The law
makes no distinction whatever between expert testimony and evidence
5
of other character."
The unfortunate consequences of that decision were demonstrated
nine years later in the highly publicized case of Berry v. Chaplin.6
A California Appellate Court, conceding that the testimony of the
complainant was in part "unique" and "extraordinary," 7 that the
blood tests excluded the putative father, and that the scientific law
of blood groupings is unquestioned, nevertheless ruled that it could
not upset the jury's verdict for the complainant because of the Supreme Court's decision in the Arats case.8
In Ohio, the experience of the courts in this field closely resembles
that of California. Although Ohio has direct statutory authority alSio Cal. (2d) 428, 74 P (2d) 1O43, 115 A. L. R. 163 (1937). In this case a verdict
for the complainant was sustained despite evidence showing the mother had
named another man as the father on the child's birth certificate, that the defendant
was seventy years of age and had been impotent for several years, according to his
wife, and that blood tests definitely excluded him as the father.
"Britt, Blood-Grouping Tests and More "Cultural Lag" (1938) 22 Minn. L.
Rev. 836, 837. Professor Britt, in observing the result in the Arais case, stated that
it "is probably the most flagrant example thus far of what may happen when a
court is blinded to scientific truths because of emotional factors." See Notes (1938)
26 Cal. L. Rev. 456, (1939) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 285.
rArais v. Kalensnikoff, io Cal. (2d) 428, 74 P (2d) io43, 1O46, 115 A. L. R.
163, 165 (1937).
074 Cal. App. (2d) 652., 169 P (2d) 442 (1946).
Mferry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. (2d) 652, 169 P (2d) 442, 450 (1946).
6The force of stare decisis in the Berry case is illustrated by Justice McComb's
concurring opinion. Feeling bound by the precedent set in the Arais case, he nevertheless said: "In the case at bar a widely accepted scientific method of determining
parentage was applied. Its results were definite. To reject the new and certain for
the old and uncertain does not tend to promote improvement in the administration
of justice." Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. (2d) 652, 169 P (2d) 442, 453 (1946). Also
see, Note (1947) 4 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 19.
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lowing the results of blood tests to be admitted in evidence, 9 the
Supreme Court of that state in passing on the weight to be accorded
exclusionary results has held that such evidence is "admissible for
whatever weight it might be given in establishing that fact,"' 1 citing
with approval the Arias decision.
In New York there appear to have been only lower court decisions
involving the use of blood tests in filiation, divorce, annulment proceeding, and actions for support of a child, and the trial courts have
not been uniform in their views of the effect of the evidence of exclusionary results. In i940, the Domestic Relations Court of the City
of New York took a decidedly conservative view in an action for support of a child, stating that the "results of blood tests by reason of
their involved experimentation, have no greater claim to credibility
than other evidence."" However, two years later another court in an
action for absolute divorce and the determination of the legitimacy
of a child, felt the exclusionary results of blood tests were enough
to overcome the strong presumption of legitimacy. 12 Similarly, in
i944, a husband was granted an absolute divorce on the grounds of
adultery when the blood tests excluded him as the father of a child
born during wedlock, despite strong testimony to show access by the
husband during the period when conception took place.' 3 It has been
said that the Court of Special Sessions of the City of New York has
even gone so far as to make the results of these tests conclusive in
14
every case.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has also indicated a favorable
view toward the results of blood groupings tests in Euclide v. State,'5
'Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Baldwin 1940) § 12122-1, 2.
'-State ex rel. Walker v. Clark, 144 Ohio St. 305, 58 N. E. (2d) 773, 777 (1944).
In State ex rel. Slovak v. Holod, 63 Ohio App. 16, 24 N. E. (2d) 962 (1939), the
court openly questioned the biological law of blood groupings, thereby illustrating
the over-cautious, suspicious, and sometimes uninformed attitude of a large part
of the bench in regard to the use of this scientific weapon against injustice. For an
analysis of these assertions by one of the outstanding medical authorities on blood
groupings, see, Weiner, The Judicial Weight of Blood Grouping Test Results (1940)
31 J. Crim. L. 523.
nHarding v. Harding, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 8io, 821 (1940). The same court, however, seems to have reversed its stand since 1940 on the weight of such tests. In Saks
v. Saks, 71 N. Y. S. (2d) 797 (1947), Judge Panken found the respondent not the
father where the new rh factor excluded the accused, despite the fact that the
MN and AB tests did not show exclusion and where other evidence indicated
access by the respondent.
"Schulze v. Schulze, 35 N. Y. S. (2d) 218 (1942).
"Dellaria v. Dellaria, 183 Misc. 832, 52 N. Y. S. (2d) 607 (1944).
'-Note (1948) 34 Corn. L. Q. 72.
"5231 Wis. 616, 286 N. W 3 (1939). In sustaining the trial court's judgment
awarding the respondent a new trial, the court said: "In view of the several unsatis-
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although the question of the weight of such evidence was not properly
before the court in that case.
In the case of Jordan v. Mace' 6 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine has recently had, for the second time in two years, the opportunity to pass on the question of the weight to be accorded blood
tests. The evidence clearly established that the respondent had had
illicit relations with the complainant during the crucial period, and
"17
the complainant testified that "there is no other to accuse
Against this strong evidence the respondent could offer no contradictory
evidence except the results of blood tests which showed a definite
exclusion. In spite of this scientific proof of non-paternity, the jury
returned a verdict for the complainant,' 8 and the respondent's motion for a new trial was rejected by the trial judge. On appeal, the
judgment of the trial court was reversed by the Supreme Judicial
Court and a new trial was granted. 19
In reaching its conclusion, the court emphasized the care with
which the tests were conducted, and declared: "If the jury found
that the results of the blood groupings tests were inaccurate, such
findings must have been based on mere conjecture or understandable sympathy for the complainant and prejudice against the respondent. Such finding is not supported by any believable evidence in the
20
record."
But the most significant language employed in the opinion confactory and improbable aspects of the testimony, and in view of the positive exclusion of defendant by the blood tests, however irregularly offered, we feel that
in the interests of justice this case should be retried under circumstances that will
give to the plaintiff in error an opportunity to present in proper form medical
conclusions based upon blood tests." 231 Wis. 616, 286 N. W 3, 4 (1939).
1169 A. (2d) 670, (Me. 1949).
2769 A. (2d) 670, 672 (Me. 1949).
6
The emotional factor is one of the greatest obstacles to justice in paternity
cases. Professor Britt aptly describes the situation: "A decision can easily rest on
sympathy for a particular woman, or it can rest on addiction to the vague symbols
of 'Womanhood' and 'Motherhood.' The judge and jury may hear how a poor,
innocent girl was taken advantage of by a hard, cruel man. He is a rascal, they
may say, even to be accused in this affair-make him payl" Britt, Blood Grouping
Tests and the Law: The Problem of "Cultural Lag" (1937) 21 Minn. L. Rev. 671, 699.
"In its opinion, the court did not mention the contentions upon which the
arguments of counsel were based. However, respondent's counsel in the Mace case
stated that one of its arguments was based on the principle that "the court should
take judicial notice and accept the biological law relative to the inheritance of
blood types and groups and that the only material evidence from the doctor performing the tests is as to the results obtained, the conclusion to be drawn from
that result being a question of law for the court." (Letter to writer of this comment
dated March 15, 1950 from H. W Blaisdell, counsel for the respondent.)
169 A. (2d) 670, 673 (Me. 1949).
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cerned the weight which must be given the negative proof of blood
tests. The court said: "
a jury may not give such weight as it may
desire to biological law Such a law goes beyond the opinion of an
expert. The jury has the duty to determine if the conditions existed
which made the biological law operative. That is to say, were the
tests properly made? If so made, the exclusion of the respondent as
father of one child follows irresistibly. '21 These words alone seem
to give conclusive weight to blood test evidence, and the court made
its position even more clear with this statement: "The blood grouping
test statute was enacted to provide, in our view, for the very situation in which a respondent, as a matter of ordinary proof without
the tests, can do no more than create a doubt about the paternity
of a child. Exclusion of paternity by blood groupings tests under
22
biological law is scientific proof that a respondent is not the father."
The Mace case outwardly appears to be irreconcilable with the
decision of the same court in Jordan v. Dav1s, 23 rendered one year
earlier. The factual situations in the two cases were practically
identical. The respondent in each instance was found to have had
sexual intercourse with the complainant near the time of conception. In
neither case did the respondent deny access or attempt to prove
access by others. The blood tests were conducted by the same serologist, and in each case the results showed the respondent was not
the father. 24 Identical also was the manner in which the cases came
before the court of last resort for review. In each, the jury found
for the complainant and exception was taken to the trial judge's
refusal to grant a new trial. However, the Supreme Judicial Court
in the Davs case upheld the judgment of the trial court, basing its
decision on the ground that the "jury could in considering all
1169 A. (2d) 67o, 672 (Me. 1949).

269 A. (2d) 670, 672 (Me. 1949). It is interesting to note that the result here
reached by the Maine court was under a statute which merely allows the results
of blood tests to be introduced in evidence, without provision for the weight to
be given such evidence. Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 153 § 34357 A. (2d) 2o9 (Me. 1949).
2Indeed, the only real factual difference between the two cases, as indicated
by the court's opinion, was that the Mace case involved twins and the blood tests
excluded only one of them. This unusual question in the case was answered in
testimony given by the serologist to the effect that if the respondent was excluded
as the father of one child, it necessarily followed that he could not be the father
of the other child, since the father of twins has to be one and the same person.
(Medical authorities, however, are not in complete agreement with this conclusion.)
The court did not accept or reject the accuracy of this statement, preferring to
side-step the issue by saying "the verdict that the respondent is the father of the
twins is indivisible. If paternity of one child is excluded, the verdict may not stand."
Jordan v. Mace, 69 A. (2d) 67o, 671 (Me. 1949).

1950]

RECENT CASES

the testimony have rejected the accuracy of the blood groupings
tests

"25

No testimony was pointed out by the court in its opinion from
which such an inference of error could be drawn. Counsel for the
respondent in both cases has pointed out certain testimony which
perhaps provides an explanation.2 6 The doctor who performed the
tests in the Davis case did not testify as to the number of times the
tests had been made. He did state that the results were checked, but
it could be inferred that the tests had been performed only once.
This may have been the reason the Maine court was willing to allow
the jury to disregard those tests, but not the same type of tests in the
Mace case which had there been employed eleven times.
Some of the language employed in the Davis opinion also seems
contrary in principle to the rule enunciated by the court in the
Mace decision. Thus, it was said by Judge Thaxter in the Davis
opinion: "We do not believe that the statute intending to make the
result of a blood grouping test as reported in court conclusive on
the issue of non-paternity. It says only that the result of such test
'shall be admissible in evidence.' "27 In using the qualifying phrase,
"as reported in court," the court may have been indicating that the
results alone should not be conclusive without ample evidence being
offered to rule out any possible inference of error in the application
of the scientific techniques used in conducting the tests. If this implication is justifiable, an apparent inconsistency in principle tends to
disappear, the opposite result in the cases being based solely on the
inference in the Davis case that one set of tests was not sufficient to
make the biological law operative. This reconciliation is further supported by the observation in the Mace decision that: "Jordan v Davis
is not authority for the proposition that a jury may give such weight
28
as it may desire to biological law."
Although the court did not state positively in either opinion
that where the evidence leaves no reasonable inference of error in
the application of the tests there is conclusive proof of non-patrnity,
it is submitted that the result in the Mace case, on its facts, supports
such a conclusion.
It is significant that the Mace case is the first decided by a court
of last resort which has been found tending to give the results of
257 A.
"Letter
counsel for
757 A.
269 A.

(2d) 209, 211 (Me. 1948).

to writer of this comment dated March 15, 1950 from H. W Blaisdell,
respondent.
(2d) 209, 210 (Me. 1948).
(2d) 670, 672 (Me. 1949).
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blood tests their just weight. The failure of other courts to apply
scientific truth in place of unreliable and often contradictory testimony from the parties, who may not even know who is the true
father, and who often are more desirous of concealing than proving
the true facts, has caused a tremendous amount of criticism from the
legal and medical writers during the last fifteen years. One of the outstanding authorities in this field has recently declared: "The courts
can no longer afford to ignore this scientific achievement. Blood tests
are no longer in the experimental stage. They are an accomplished
fact of science and an immutable law of nature. Their capacity to
prove the innocence of more than half of the men incorrectly accused is a mandate to the courts to abandon their skepticism, doubt
and misbelief, and accept blood test exclusions, competently and
conscientiously performed, as decisive evidence of non-paternity. '29
It is hoped that other courts in the future will accept the enlightened view of the Maine court and give unqualified approval to the
impartial scientific truth which may be found through the use of
blood tests.
ERNEST M.

FEDERAL PROCEDURE-DISPOSITION
ORARI AFTER

PETITIONER

HOLDAwVAY

OF CASE BEFORE COURT ON CERTI-

HAS FLED JURISDICTION.

[United States

Supreme Court]
The Supreme Court of the United States recently was called
upon to decide the question of its jurisdiction' on a seemingly unique
set of facts. Specifically, the Court's problem was whether it still
had jurisdiction in a certiorari proceeding after the petitioner had
fled from the United States, and if jurisdiction did not exist, as a
matter of its own practice, what disposition to make of the case.
Since the days of the first President, the Supreme Court has
steadfastly refused to give advisory opinions or to take part in a
proceeding not a "case" or "controversy," 2 but over the course of
a century and a half, the Court has expressed in varying terms its
"Shatkin, Law and Science in Collision: Use of Blood Tests in Paternity Suits
(1946) 32 Va. L. Rev. 886, 9o.

'As limited by Article III of the United States Constitution relating to the
necessity of there being a "case" or "controversy."
2See 3 Johnston, Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay (1891) 486,
and io Sparks, Writings of George Washington (1839) 542, for a discussion of the
several questions relating to the legal power of the President which Washington
sought to have the Court decide.
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conception of what is necessary to constitute a case or controversy.
In 1864, Chief Justice Taney stated that "The award of execution
is a part, and an essential part of every judgment passed by a court
exercising judicial power."3 Justice Field, while a federal circuit
court judge, in defining "controversy" concluded that "The term
implies the existence of present or possible adverse parties whose contentions are submitted to the court for adjudication." 4 But in 1937,
the Supreme Court took the view that "It is the nature of the controversy, not the method of its presentation or the particular party
who presents it, that is determinative." 5
In the recent case of Eisler v. United States,6 the Court seems to
have passed over an excellent opportunity to clarify the law applicable
in this field. Gerhart Eisler, an Austrian national, was summoned to
appear before the House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities on February 6, 1947 On February 4, Eisler was taken
into custody to prevent his departure from the country. Two days
later, he appeared before the Committee, with counsel, and refused
to be sworn unless allowed to speak first. The Committee voted to
cite Eisler for contempt of Congress, and subsequently, an indictment
was returned against Eisler by the Grand Jury for the District of
Columbia, charging him with contempt of Congress.1 Eisler was
tried before a jury in the District Court of the United States for the
District of Columbia and found guilty. He appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and on
June 14, 1948, that court by a vote of two to one affirmed the judgment of the lower court.8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 9
and the case was argued March 28, 1949 and waited only final disposition when, on May 6, 1949, Eisler fled the United States.
After a futile attempt by the Attorney General to secure the return
of Eisler, the Government advised the Court of this state of affairs
and suggested informally that the case be dismissed. The Supreme
Court, on June 27, 1949, announced its first decision in the principal

case, ordering, by a five to four majority, that after the term the cause
be left off the docket until a direction to the contrary. 1°
3Gordon v. United States, 117 U. S. 697, 702, 76 L. ed. 1347, 135o (1864).
'In re Pacific Ry. Com., 32 Fed. 241, 255 (C.C. N. D. Cal., 1887).
5
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 3oo U. S. 227, 244, 57 S.Ct. 461, 465,
81 L. ed. 617, 623 (1937).
6338 U. S. i89, 69 S. Ct. 1453, 93 L. ed. 1897 (1949), rev'd per curam 338
U. S. 883, 70 S. Ct. 181, 94 L. ed. 117 (1949).
72 U. S. C. A. § 192 (1937), Contempt of Congress.
884 App. D. C. 404, 170 F. (2d) 273 (1948).
0335 U. S. 857, 69 S.Ct. 130, 93 L. ed. 404 (1948).
10338 U. S. 189, 69 S.Ct. 1453, 93 L. ed. 1897 (1949).
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The majority opinion was a brief Per Curiam" to the effect that
"Since the petitioner by his own volition may have rendered moot
any judgment on the merits, we must, as a matter of our own practice,
decide whether the submission should be set aside and the writ of
certiorari dismissed or whether we should postpone review indefinitely
by ordering the case removed from the docket, pending the return
of the fugitive
Our practice, however, has been to order such
cases to be removed from the docket."'1 2 The reasoning behind this

decision might have been either that the Court now lacked jurisdiction or that the Court did not wish to decide the case at this point;
thus Eisler was left a timely perfected appeal indefinitely before the
Court.
In the first of three dissenting opinions, Justice Frankfurter, with
whom Chief Justice Vinson joined, argued that the Government's
motion to dismiss should have been granted on the ground that the
Court had been deprived of jurisdiction to adjudicate the case. It
was reasoned that "the Constitution gave this Court no power to
give answers to legal questions as such but merely the authority to
decide them when a litigant was before the Court."' 3 And since
Eisler has repudiated the jurisdiction of this country. "The upshot is
that the abstract questions brought before the Court by Eisler are
no longer attached to any litigant. No matter remains before us as
to which we could issue process.' 4 "If legal questions brought by a
litigant are to remain here, the litigant must stay with them
Since the Court is without power effectively to decide against him, it
is without power to decide at all. In short, the Court no longer has
jurisdiction
"15 This being true, it seems that the writ of certiorari should have been dismissed, thus leaving the decision of the
Court of Appeals intact and precluding subsequent appeal by Eisler.
In two able separate dissenting opinions, Justices Murphy and
"Justices Rutledge, Douglas, Reed, Black and Burton, for the Court.
"338 U. S. 189, 19o, 69 S. Ct. 1453, 1454 (1949) ritalics suppliedi. The Court
cited as authority Smith v. United States, 94 U. S. 97, 24 L. ed. 32 (1876), and
Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U. S. 692, 8 S. Ct. 1390, 31 L. ed. 854 (1887).
"338 U. S. 189, 191, 69 S. Ct. 1453, 1454, 93 L. ed. 1897, 1900 (1949).
"4338 U. S. 189, 191, 69 S. Ct. 1453, 1454, 93 L. ed. 1897, 1899 (1949).
'338 U. S. 189, 192, 69 S. Ct. 1453, 1455, 93 L. ed. 1897, 19oo (1949). This case
was distinguished from Smith v. United States, 94 U. S. 97, 24 L. ed. 32 (1876),
and Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U. S.692, 8 S.Ct. 1390, 31 L. ed. 854 (1887), in that
the Court suspended disposition of those cases temporarily until the recapture of
the fugitives who were at large in this country. The situation at hand is totally
different. "Since the Court's power to reassert jurisdiction has been incontestably
denied, the motion should be granted." 338 U. S. 189, 193, 69 S. Ct. 1453, 1455,
93 L. ed. 1897, 1900 (1949).
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Jackson both concluded that the Court continued to have jurisdiction
of the case and that a decision on the merits should have been handed
down. Justice Murphy argued that, though the Court has no power
to decide a "moot" case, such a case "is one in which the particular
controversy confronting the Court has ended. That is not true when
a prisoner has simply escaped." 16 The petitioner having subjected
himself to the Court's jurisdiction by filing a petition for review,
these dissenters argued that he cannot revoke or nullify it and prevent
adjudication merely by leaving the country. "[It] is the importance
of the legal issues, not the parties, which bring the case to this Court.
Those issues did not leave when Eisler did. They remain . of the
utmost importance to the profession and to the public."'17 Justice
Jackson concurred in this position, pointing out that "it is due to
Congress and to future witnesses before its committees that we hand
down a final decision."'I s The questions presented are certain to recur,
and "No can know what the law is until this case is decided or until
someone can carry a like case through the two lower courts again to
get the question here."' 19 And Eisler's rights would not be prejudiced,
because "The case is fully submitted and all that remains is for members of the Court to hand down their opinions and the decision.
20
Eisler's presence for that would be neither necessary nor usual."
The record in the case remained thus until October 8, 1949, when
the Government appeared before the Court and filed a formal motion
to dismiss. On November 21, 1949, the Court entered the following
order: "The motion to dismiss is granted and the writ of certiorari
is dismissed." 21 Apparently, this ended a litigation that had caused
the Government to expend a considerable amount of time and money,
yet produced inadequate results. Of course, if Eisler should return
to the United States, the sentence as affirmed by the Court of Appeals
would be binding, but the judgment of the Court of Appeals on the
merits has not the persuasive weight that a decision of the Supreme
Court would have carried.
Admittedly, this set of facts is unique in that no case has been
found in which a person convicted of a federal offense has used the
stay of execution of sentence, while the Supreme Court is reviewing
"338 U. S. I89,
States v. Evans, 213
'338 U. S. 189,
"338 U. S. i89,
"338 U. S. 189,
^0338 U. S. 189,
21338 U. S. 883,

194, 69 S. Ct. 1453, 1455, 93 L. ed. 1897, 19Oi (1949). See United
U. S. 297, 29 S. Ct. 507, 53 L. ed. 8o3 (igog).
194, 69 S. Ct. 1453, 1456, 93 L. ed. 1897, 19o (1949).
196, 69 S. Ct. 1453, 1456, 93 L. ed. 1897, 1902 (1949).
196, 69 S. Ct. 1453, 1456, 93 L. ed. 1897, 1902 (1949).
195, 69 S. Ct. 1453, 1456, 93 L. ed. 1897, 1901 (1949).
7o S. Ct. 181, 94 L. ed. 117 (1949).
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the conviction, as a means of escaping from this country. The two
cases 22 cited as authority by the majority of the Court in the first
decision are distinguishable from the principal case in that in those
cases the escape of the prisoners was not likely to be permanently
successful and the Court suspended final decision until the recapture
of the fugitives. This seems to have been done as a matter of expediency and not due to a rule of law.
A review of the case law of the several states shows a line of authorities for dismissal of appeals in cases presenting the same problem.
In Madden v. Georga,23 the rule was laid down that escaped prisoners who have not surrendered or been recaptured cannot prosecute
a writ of error. The Louisiana court has reached the same conclusion
in State v. Butler" 24 This seems to be a reasonable and just result
where one who seeks justice from a court nevertheless refuses to
submit his person to the jurisdiction of that court. The Georgia
and Louisiana decisions lay down the rule that if the time limit set
for perfecting an appeal or writ of error is passed while the fugitive
is still at large, it is too late for him to appeal after he is apprehended.
In Allen v. Georgza,25 the United States Supreme Court held that
dismissal of a writ of error by the state court because of the appellant's
escape was not denial of due process of law. The appellant in that
case had been given sixty days to surrender before the writ of error
was dismissed.
If the Supreme Court felt that it had lost jurisdiction of Eisler's
case after his flight, it would seem proper and within the spirit of
the Rules of Court and statutes pertaining to appeals for the Court
to have ruled that this voluntary action on the petitioner's part should
lead to a dismissal of the appeal and the running of the time limit
set for appeals.
Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states that
"In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's
voluntary absence after the trial has commenced in his presence shall
not prevent continuing the trial to and including the return of the
verdict." 26 This rule is declaratory of existing federal case law, and
shows that the defendant's voluntary absence after proceedings have
"Smith v. United States, 94 U. S. 97, 24 L. ed. 32 (1876), and Bonahan v.
Nebraska, 125 U. S. 692, 8 S. Ct. i3go, 31 L. ed. 854 (1887).
270 Ga. 383 (1883).

235 La. Ann. 392 (1883).
2166 U. S. 138, i7 S. Ct. 525, 4 L. ed. 949 (1897).
21Rule 43, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U. S. C. A., 1949 Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, 33o.
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commenced will not cause the courts to suspend action in the trial
or to lose jurisdiction pending the return of the fugitive. In United
States v. Billingsley,2 7 the court refused to pass on assignments of
error until the defendant-fugitive surrendered, but gave him a specific
time in which to surrender. If this procedure is proper in the District
Courts and the Courts of Appeals, it seems that it should be proper
in the Supreme Court as well.
More than half a century ago in Falk v. Unzted States,28 the same
Federal Court of Appeals which was involved in the Eisler case dearly
indicated its recognition of the broad aspects of the problem:
"It does not seem to us to be consonant with the dictates
of common sense that an accused person, being at large upon
bail, should be at liberty, whenever he pleased, to withdraw
himself from the courts of his country and to break up a trial
already commenced. The practical result of such a proposition,
if allowed to'be law, would be to prevent any trial whatever
until the accused person himself should be pleased to permit
it. For by the statute29 . he is entitled as a matter of right to
be at large upon bail 'in all criminal cases where the offense
is not punishable by death;' and, therefore, in all such cases,
he may, by absconding, prevent a trial. This would be a travesty
of justice which could not be tolerated; and it is not required or
justified by any regard for the right of personal liberty. On the
contrary, the inevitable result would be to abridge the right of
personal liberty by abridging or restricting the right now
granted by the statute to be abroad on bail until the verdict
is rendered." 30
It is obvious from the standpoint of public policy and the administration of justice that some other rule than that laid down by the
Court's majority opinion in the first decision was needed. The Court's
final order appears more in line with the authority in tis field, but
the best interests of justice would seem to require the Court to retain
jurisdiction in criminal cases of the nature of the principal case. The
question of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner is one that
should be settled when he submits his case to the Court on certiorari.
If that jurisdiction is to be contested thereafter, it is the petitioner
who should bear the burden of argument. Unless he does so, his
absence from the proceedings should not preclude a decision on the
merits of the points of law advanced.
J. STANLEY LIVESAY, JR.

-242 Fed. 3o (W D. Wash. 1917), aff'd

249

Fed. 331 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918), cert.

denied 247 U. S. 523 (1918).
6

'5 App. D. C. 44 (1899).
SNow § 3141 of the New Title 18. See F. C. A. 18 § 3141 (195o).
3015 App. D. C. 446, 454 (1899)-
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MORTGAGES-RIGHT OF MORTGAGOR To HAVE LIEN BARRED BY STATUTE

OF LIMITATIONS REMOVED AS CLOUD ON TITLE.

[Illinois]

When a mortgage or deed of trust given to secure a debt becomes
barred by the statute of limitations, it is universally accepted that the
mortgagor may plead the statute as a defense to any action brought
by the mortgagee; however, considerable uncertainty remains as to
whether in such a situation the mortgagor may bring an affirmative
action to have the mortgage removed from record as a cloud on his
title. The recent case of Gary-Wheaton Bank v. Helton' is one of the
relatively rare instances in which this question has been presented
in a court of record. Plaintiff acquired title to the land in question
through a sheriff's deed made under an order of execution and
sale. The record disclosed a lien on this land, represented by

a trust deed securing two notes of $i,ooo each. At the time of the
execution sale, the notes and deed of trust were barred by the statute
of limitations, and the plaintiff now brings this action to have the
lien removed as constituting a cloud on his title. The trial court, in
granting the relief prayed for, took the position that since the trust
deed was a mere incident of the barred debt, the trust deed was also
barred and should be released. In reviewing that decision, the Illinois
Appellate Court viewed the sole issue as being whether the trial court
was in error in deciding that the statute of limitations "not only
barred the remedy but also barred the lien."
The court defined a cloud on title as "an outstanding claim
or encumbrance, which, if valid, would affect or impair the title of
the owner, and which appears on its face to have that effect, but
which can be shown by extrinsic evidence to be invalid. A cloud
exists where a title of an adverse party to land is valid upon the face
of the instrument or the proceedings sought to be set aside, and it
requires extrinsic facts to show the supposed conveyance to be inoperative and void'-2 The court approved the reasoning that the debt
alone gave rise to the substantive rights in the mortgagee and that
the lien created by the deed of trust is a mere incident of the debt.
When the debt is barred by the statute of limitations, it becomes
invalid, thereby making the lien created by the deed of trust invalid.3
'337 Ill. App. 294, 85 N. E. (2d) 472 (1948). Only an abstract of the case is
reported in the Northeastern Reporter. The statement of facts and the holding
set out in this comment were taken from a copy of the opinion of the Illinois
Appellate Court furnished by the Clerk of the Illinois Appellate Court, Second
District.
2Quoting Roby v. South Park Com'rs, 215 Ill. 2oo, 2o3, 74 N. E. 125, 126 (igo5).
'See Ill. Rev. Stat. (1948) c. 83 § i6: "The lien of every mortgage, trust deed
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The purported lien then stands as a cloud on title under the stated
definition, and the court determined that it must remove the cloud
in order to avoid creating a situation in which "there is a right to a
lien and no remedy to enforce it."
This approach to the problem involves two questionable determinations. First, the court adopted the view at the outset that a debt
barred by the statute of limitations is "invalid," and language was
quoted from, several Illinois decisions' to support that position. However, in these earlier cases the term "invalid" seems to have been used
in the sense of "unenforceable" rather than "extinguished," since, in
effect, the question in issue was whether a mortgagee could foreclose
a mortgage on which the statute of limitations period had not yet
run when the debt it secured was barred by limitations. To adhere
to the rule accepted in Illinois and a minority of jurisdictions, that
once the debt is barred by the statute of limitations the mortgage,
subsisting as a lien only for the purpose of securing the debt, is also
barred,5 it was not necessary that the court go so far as to declare
the debt invalid to allow the mortgagor to interpose the statute of
limitations as a defense. The unenforceability of the debt is sufficient
reason for refusing to enforce the mortgage, inasmuch as the mortgage
exists only to provide a means of obtaining payment of the debt. This
analysis is strengthened by a more recent decision in which the Suin the nature of a mortgage, and vendor's lien, the due date of which is stated
upon the face, or ascertainable from the written terms thereof . shall cease by
limitation after the expiration of twenty years from the time the last payment on
such mortgage, trust deed in the nature of a mortgage, or vendor's lien becomes
due upon its face and according to its written terms .... " The defendant argued
that the deed of trust should not be removed as a cloud on title since twenty
years had not elapsed as stated in the above section of the statute. The Illinois
this section has no appliAppellate Court discounted this argument, stating: "
is to provide a
cation to the problem under consideration. The sole purpose
twenty year limitation for unrecorded extensions."
"In reaching this conclusion the court relied on Pollock v. Maison, 41 Ill. 516
(1866); Hams v. Mills, 28 Ill. 44 (1862); Gibson v. Rees, 5o Ill. 383 (869). "
where the debt, the principal thing, is gone, the incident, the mortgage, is gone
also, and .. a foreclosure in any mode cannot then be had, either by ejectment,
scire facias, bill in equity or otherwise." Pollock v. Maison, 41 Ill. 516, 521 (1866).
iThe majority of jurisdictions hold that even though the debt be barred by
the statute of limitations, the mortagagee may still assert his rights to foreclosure
under the mortgage so long as the statute of limitations has not run as to it. 2
Glenn, Mortgages (1943) § 141. It would seem, however, that the problem of a
barred mortgage being a cloud on title would be the same regardless of which
rule the jurisdiction follows. The only apparent difference would concern the
element of time, in that the problem would arise upon the running of the shorter
limitation period for debts in the minority of states, whereas the problem would
not arise in the majority jurisdictions until the running of the longer statutory
period for mortgages.
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preme Court of Illinois declared explicitly that "the theory of limitation laws
is that they bar the right to sue but do not extinguish
the debt or the property right." 6
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, it would seem that the
court's basic assumption of an invalid debt is not well founded
because the debt is still valid, though unenforceable. As the deed
of trust is a mere incident of the debt it, too, is not invalid but unenforceable. Since one of the basic elements in the definition of a cloud
on title is an invalid claim and since a barred deed of trust is merely
unenforceable, it does not properly fall within the definition, and
therefore, is not a cloud on title.
Even if it be assumed that the barred deed of trust does create
a cloud on title, the problem remains as to whether it is one which
an equity court will remove by affirmative action instituted by the
mortgagor. This phrase of the question apparently received no consideration in the principal decision; it was merely assumed that if
the lien is found to be "invalid," the cloud will be removed at the
request of the land owner. However, the same result has been reached
where this issue was specifically argued. In Ramiller v. Ramiller7
the mortgage had become barred by the statute of limitations through
the mortgagee's failure to execute properly an extension of the instrument of the debt. The Supreme Court of Iowa granted affirmative
relief to the mortgagor by releasing the barred mortgage of record
saying it constituted a cloud on his title. The mortgagee argued "that
since appellees were seeking equity they must do equity, and since
the debt was unpaid it would be inequitable and against conscience
to grant them affirmative relief by quieting title to the land as against
his mortgage." 8 This argument was rejected by the Iowa Court with
the terse statement "There is also a maxim, in substance stating, that
equity aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights."9
Another state has provided the answer by including in the statute
6

Fleming v. Yeazel, 379 Ill. 343, 40 N. E. (2d) 507, 508 (1942).

1236 Iowa 323, 18 N. W (2d) 622 (1945).
'Ramiller v. Ramiller, 236 Iowa 323, 18 N. W (2d) 622, 626 (1945).
9
Ramiller v. Ramiller, 236 Iowa 323, 18 N. W 2d) 622, 626 (1945). The maxim
that "equity aids the vigilant" is a remedial principle adopted by courts of equity
in earlier times as an analogy to the statutes of limitations which were expressly
confined to law courts. As the modem statutes of limitations apply to equity courts
as well as to the law courts, the doctrine operates only on those cases not falling
within the scope of the statutory limitations. 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence ( 5 th
ed. 1941) § 419a. Since the statute of limitations clearly covered the controversy in
this case it would seem that the Iowa Court has unduly extended the application
of the principle, in that it should work in conjunction with the more general
principle "that he who seeks equity must do equity," and not be antagonistic to it.
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of limitations a provision that the lien is extznguished upon the running of the statutory period.o By such a statute the legislature has
impliedly given its sanction to suits of quia timet in cases where
the mortgage or deed of trust has become barred by the statute of
limitations.
The continuing moral obligation of the debtor to pay, even after
legal remedies are barred, has led several courts to deny such relief.
In Booth v. Hoskzns" the plaintiff had given a deed, intended as a
mortgage, to the defendant in return for a loan. This debt became
barred by the statute of limitations, which also barred foreclosure
on the mortgage. The California court, in refusing plaintiff's requested
relief of removing the mortgage as a cloud on his title, declared: "The
fact that a debt is barred by the statute of limitations in no way
releases the debtor from his moral obligation to pay it. Moreover,
one of the maxims which courts of equity should always act upon
is.. that he who seeks equity must do equity . we think the
plaintiffs should be denied any affirmative relief until the money
justly due to the defendant is paid."' 2 In other cases 13 it has been
ruled that the barred instrument may be removed as a cloud only
on condition that the mortgagor pay the amount which in equity he
owes, which seems merely an affirmative way of saying what the California court stated negatively. This same principle was applied in
House v. Carr 4 in which the New York court refused to enjoin a sale
being made under a power of sale when both the debt and mortgage
were barred by the statute of limitations. The court held the statute
was not a basis of affirmative relief,S and a sale made out of court
would pass good title even though the mortgagor would have a valid
defense in a foreclosure action.
This rule, that a party's title will not be quieted against a mortgage barred by limitations unless he pays the mortgage debt is subject
"Mont. Rev. Codes (19o7) § 5728, as interpreted by Berkin v. Healy, 52 Mont.
398, 158 Pac. 1o2o (1916).
n75 Cal. 271, 17 Pac. 225 (1888).
"Booth v. Hoskins, 75 Cal. 271 , 17 Pac. 225, 227 (1888). The same was held to
be true where, as in the principal case, the mortgagor had conveyed his interest
to a third party. As the grantee is presumed not to have paid full value, he is
in the same position as the grantor. De Cazara v. Orena, 8o Cal. 132, 22 Pac. 74 (1889).
"Power & Irrig. Co. v. Capay Ditch Co., 226 Fed. 634 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915);
Provident Mut. Bldg. & L. Ass'n v. Schwertner, i5 Arz. 517, 140 Pac. 495 (1914).
"1185 N. Y. 453, 78 N. E. 171 (19o6).
""It must be borne in mind that the statute of limitations in this state never
pays or discharges a debt, but only affects the remedy ... [I]f there be another
remedy not affected by the statute . a creditor may enforce his claim through
that remedy." House v. Carr, 185 N. Y. 453, 78 N. E. 171, 172 (1906).
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to qualifications. In Gardner v. Terry, the plaintiff, claiming "that he
and his grantors have been in actual, open, notorious, adverse possession of the lots
,16 brought suit to enjoin the defendants from
exercising the power of sale in a trust deed which had become barred.
The court in granting the injunction held the above rule was not
applicable where the plaintiff holds title adversely to the deed of
trust. "In general, the statute of limitations is in defense only, but
io years' adverse possession of real estate will not only bar an action
of ejectment, but it will confer title upon the possessor
It is
therefore difficult to see why a title thus acquired is not entitled to
the same protection as a title acquired in any other way."' 17 As the
plaintiff could successfully interpose adverse possession as a defense to
an action of ejectment brought by the purchaser at the foreclosure sale,
then a court of equity has power "to prevent a cloud being cast upon
the title to real estate
as well
as
power to remove one already

created."'S
Further, affirmative relief has been allowed to a purchaser who
"acquired the [mortgaged] land
for a consideration after the lapse
of the time within which an action to foreclose the mortgage could
have been brought
,,9 Since the purchaser was not personally
liable for the debt, and was under no moral obligation to the mortgagee to discharge it, the California court felt that all privity had
been severed between the grantees of the mortgagor and the mortgagee, and therefore gave affirmative relief as an exception to the
20
general rule.
The argument denying affirmative relief to the mortgagor or his
"99 Mo. 523, 12 S. W 888 (i8go). See also Klumpke v. Moreno, 24 Cal. App.
35, 140 Pac. 289 (1914).
"'Gardner v. Terry, 99 Mo. 523, 12 S. W 888, 889 (i8go).
"Gardner v. Terry, 99 Mo. 523, 12 S. W 888, 889 (1890). The court did not
make it clear how the adverse possession came about.
"Faxon v. All Persons, 166 Cal. 7o7, 137 Pac. 919, 925 (1913). This exception
was again upheld by the California court in Fontana Land Co. v. Laughlin, 199
Cal. 625, 250 Pac. 669, 675 (1926), in which the court held, "The instant case presents a situation far less favorable to respondent than the ordinary relation of
mortgagor and mortgagee, or the assigns of either. Here the law intervened and
absolutely severed all privity that may have
existed between the orginial parties
or their assigns." It must be noticed, however, that in both cases the original mortgagor died subsequent to the running of the statute of limitations and the plaintiff
based his claim of title on a deed from the executor of the mortgagor which
necessarily required the approval of the probate court. In neither case did the
mortgagee attempt to prove his claim in the probate proceedings. De Sazara v.
Orena, 8o Cal. 132, 22 Pac. 74 (1889) indicates that this exception would not
apply to one who purchased from the mortgagor.
"0As adopted in Booth v. Hoskins, 75 Cal. 271, 17 Pac. 225 (1888).
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successor in tide, centers around the well-known maxim of equity
that he who comes into equity must do equity.2 1 Unless there is
present some statutory authority, or some factor such as adverse
possession or lack of privity, which, in the minds of the court, would
justify the release of the lien, courts of equity generally feel constrained
to deny the mortgagor relief from his moral obligation to pay the
debt. The mortgagor might well argue that the law favors the avoidance of restrictions on the alienability of land, and that to allow a
barred lien to remain of record would prejudice the public interest
in that the owner likely would be deterred from making the most
effective use of his property.2 2 Granting that both the mortgagor and
the mortgagee are supported in their arguments by considerations of
public policy, it would seem doubtful that courts of equity should
be expected to overthrow, of their own accord, the fundamental principle that one seeking the aid of equity must himself be willing to
act equitably. If policy considerations are strong enough to demand
that affirmative relief be afforded to a mortgagor to clear his land
of the cloud cast by a barred but unsatisfied lien, the legislature, as
the branch of the government primarily vested with the function of
determining matters of policy, is the proper authority to provide
for such relief.
WILLIAM E. QUISENBERRY

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-OBLIGATIONS

ARISING FROM OPERATION OF

MUNICIPAL UTILITIES BEYOND CoRPoRATE LIMiTS.

[Virginia]

The increasing tendency of Virginia municipalities to operate

their utilities beyond the corporate limits for the sole purpose of
21A request by a mortgagor for the removal, as a cloud on title, of a just
moral obligation appears to be sufficient to shock the conscience of a court of
equity. In addition, the court must consider that a policy of removing barred
mortgages as a cloud on title would permit the mortgagor to enjoin any attempt
by the mortgagee to realize the benefit of his security, without the aid of the
courts, through advertisement and sale. Further, such a policy could conceivably
prevent the eventual satisfaction of the debt if the relationship of the parties were
ever to result in the debtor being a legatee or distributee of the creditor. In this
event the creditor's personal representative may normally set-off the barred indebtedness against the debtor's legacy or distributive share.
22The argument in favor of removing a mortgage barred by the statute of
limitations is that it is in the public interest that property be applied to its most

effective use, that it not be withdrawn from commerce, and that it be improved.
2 Tiffany, Real Property (3d ed. 1939) § 392. The mortgagor might further argue
that refusal of affirmative relief would result in a perpetual, unenforceable lien
which will avail the mortgagee of nothing and therefore be a detriment to the
public interest.
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acquiring additional revenue has created dual problems in the relationship between municipal water departments and out-of-city water
consumers to whom surplus supplies may be sold under Virgima law.'
The general principle is that a municipal corporation possesses
and can exercise no other powers than those granted in expressed
words in its charter, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incidental
to the powers expressly granted, and those essential-not simply convenient, but indispensable-to the declared object and purpose of
the corporation. 2 Dillon states the basic rule in regard to the city's
function in operating water works: "The purpose for which a municipality is authorized to construct water works or to contract for a
supply of water is usually to supply its own needs, and the needs of
its inhabitants, and it may be laid down as a general rule that a grant
of power to a municipality for these purposes gives it by implication
no authority to enter into the business of furnishing water to persons
beyond the municipal limits." 3
In Virginia, however, the situation is complicated by the fact that
on the one hand the term "surplus" has, in practice, been construed
to cover as large a quantity of water as the city might desire to sell
to outside users, 4 and that on the other hand a state statute of 1918
requires a city to furnish water to out-of-city consumers formerly
served by a plant taken over by the city from a public utility company. 5
Though the purpose of the statute to protect persons against an
abrupt interruption of their water supply is obvious, the effect of the
legislation might readily create an evil as great as the one sought to
be remedied. In seeking to assure the non-resident consumer of an
adequate supply of water, it forces an obligation on the municipalities which could deprive them of the necessary means of serving their
own inhabitants.
While this potentially troublesome problem has not yet been directly met in the courts, the recent case of City of South Norfolk v.
1
See City of South Norfolk v. City of Norfolk, 58 S. E. (2d) 32 (Va. 1950); Mt.
Jackson v. Nelson, 151 Va. 396, 145 S.E. 355 (1928).
-1 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (3d ed. 1911) § 89.
'3 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5 th ed. 1911) § 1299.
4See notes 9 and io, snfra.
Wa. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 15-716. "2.Whenever any city or town shall
lease or purchase any gas, electric or water plant operating within territory contiguous to such city or town .,any city or town acquiring or leasing any said
property hereunder shall rest under obligation to furnish, from the said property
so leased or acquired, or from any other source, an adequate supply of gas, electricity or water to the consumers, of any said company whose plant is so purchased
or leased."
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City of Norfolk,6 is the latest pronouncement of the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals bearing on the legal relation of city and outside
water consumers in regard to the obligation of a city to serve customers beyond the corporate limits. The court was not required to
determine the full scope of the obligation of municipalities under
the statute, though the situation involved exemplifies the existence
of the problem.
Prior to 1918, the City of South Norfolk had for many years
been receiving its water supply from various water companies serving
a large area. In that year, the water company then serving South
Norfolk, conveyed its plant to the City of Portsmouth, subject to an
option previously granted to the City of Norfolk. Norfolk exercised
its option in 1923, by acquiring a portion of the water system serving
South Norfolk, but continued to serve the outside consumers under a
succession of contracts. When the last contract between Norfolk and
South Norfolk expired on October 18, 1948, Norfolk denied any
obligation to serve outside consumers further, and refused to furnish
water except at greatly increased rates. South Norfolk paid the increased rates under protest and sought a declaratory judgment decreeing Norfolk's obligation to serve.
The court held that under the 1918 statute Norfolk was obligated
to serve the complainant, but it was declared that a provision of a
charter granted to Norfolk in 1918 also, limiting the rights of Norfolk
to sell water beyond its boundaries to the disposal of surplus water
only, placed restrictions on the statutory obligation to supply water,
and both provisions were to be construed together. In this specific
case, then, the fortunate accident that the Norfolk city charter contained a provision for sale of surplus water enabled that city to be
spared the possibility of excessive demands of outside customers.
The South Norfolk decision determines no more than that Norfolk is obligated to furnish the City of South Norfolk water under the
1918 statute, and that obligation is qualified by the charter provision
given to Norfolk in 1918. The court, however, went on to some length
to indicate the nature and extent of this qualification: "But this duty
is subject to further limitations . There may be others to whom
Norfolk owes a duty under that statute or under its deed equal to
the duty it owes South Norfolk and its inhabitants. The statute does
not give South Norfolk a right superior to the rights of other persons
protected by the statute. Neither does it warrant a construction that
would put a legal duty on Norfolk to forego all other commitments
'City of South Norfolk v. City of Norfolk, 58 S. E. (2d) 32 (Va. ig5o).
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of its surplus supply in order to serve the additions to South Norfolk
and its inhabitants that have occurred since Norfolk took over from
7
Portsmouth under its option and that may occur in the future."
Thus, it seems that Norfolk can be called upon to furnish water
to the outside areas only to the extent of its surplus supply over the
needs of its own inhabitants, and that even this obligation cannot
be expanded beyond the consumer demand of the area as of the time
Norfolk took over from Portsmouth the facilities of the public utility
company which had been supplying water to those consumers. 8
Though the city of Norfolk seems to be protected from the oppressive effect of the 1918 statute, it remains to be seen how other cities
without the saving clause in their charters will fare in similar situations. The willingness of the Virginia court to recognize broad qualifications of the obligation of Norfolk under this statute may indicate
an inclination to afford protection to a city threatened with real
prejudice from the demands of outside consumers for continued
water service. But the plain words of the statute proclaiming the obligation leave little opportunity for restrictive interpretation. It appears
that in many cases the city would be forced to an unwilling expansion
of its water facilities.
The second phase of the out-of-city water service problem chiefly
concerns the municipality which willingly undertakes to supply adjoining areas, as a means of raising revenue. Since it has been determined that cities may put their surplus water supplies to such use,9
and since "surplus" seems to mean whatever amount the city can
and wishes to make available for outside sale,10 and since the city
7

City of South Norfolk v. City of Norfolk, 58 S. E. (2d) 32, 37 (Va. ig5o).
'City of South Norfolk v. City of Norfolk, 58 S. E. (2d) 32, 37 (Va. ig5o): "We
hold, therefore, that the legal obligation of Norfolk to furnish South Norfolk and
its inhabitants with water from its surplus supply extends only to the consumers,
whether residents of the city of South Norfolk, or beyond its boundaries, who
were being supplied by the facilities which the city of Norfolk purchased and
took over on June 3o, 1923. Such consumers are not limited to the particular
individuals who were being supplied at that time, but include all inhabitants
within the area which was being supplied, or which was capable of being supplied,
by the facilities so acquired."
'Mt. Jackson v. Nelson, 151 Va. 396, 407, 145 S. E. 355, 357 (928): "It Is
a common custom for municipal corporations in Virginia to furnish water to those
who live beyond their limits. This is a source of profit to them, contributes to the
sanitation of the outlying districts, and indirectly to that of the towns themselves.
To discontinue this would, in many instances, be disastrous, and would result in
the injury of all concerned without corresponding benefit of any kind to anybody.
When to sell and when not to sell must be left, as other matters of business are
left, to their sound judgment."
"See Mt. Jackson v. Nelson, 151 Va. 396, at 403, 145 S. E. 355, at 357 (1928).
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is free to set its own rates for the service, 11 this enterprise can obviously
be made richly rewarding.
Virginia has taken adequate precautions concerning rate regulations of utilities for the protection of those living under mumcipal
rule, and those being served by a public utility. The first group finds
relief through the all-powerful ballot, which enables citizens to turn
out an administration charging excessive rates; the latter are under
the protection of the State Corporation Commission, which sets the
standard rates to be charged by the public utilities. 12 But the members
of a third group, living just beyond the municipal boundary line and
compelled to look to the municipality for their water supply because
the municipality has bought their water system, find themselves without protection against exorbitant charges.
Such a group is not only excluded from the protection of the State
3
Corporation Commission, because served by a municipal utility,1
but, being non-residents of the city, they are deprived of any control
of the municipal government through the ballot. Such a group may
be required to pay extortionate rates for the same services received
4
by city residents, or to accept inferior services.'
The Supreme Court of Appeals in the principal case did not
decide the rate regulation question, but remanded it to the trial
court.' 5 If the latter court finds that the City of Norfolk is free from

all regulation in fixing its charges for water, the consumers will probably have no alternative to paying whatever rates Norfolk may see
fit to assess, and already these are claimed to be excessive. Also, the
"Va. Const. (i902) Art. XII, § 153: "As used in this article, the term 'corporation' or 'company' shall include all trusts, associations and joint stock companies
having any powers or privileges not possessed by individuals or unlimited partnerships, and exclude all municipal corporations and public institutions owned or
controlled by the state;.. "
"Va. Const. (19o2) Art. XII, § 156 (b).
"Wa. Const. (1902) Art. XII, § 153.
"There are at least three distinct situations in which such an outside consumer
may find himself: Where the municipality has bought a water company's facilities
for future use if expansion comes, but continues to serve those outside consumers
then being served, calling the water surplus as of that time. In this situation, the
water sold as surplus does not at any time, pass within the municipal limits. Rates
charged for this water are not subject to regulation because the water is furnished
by a municipal utility.
Where the city brings in water from a source beyond its boundary and the
non-residents hook up, withdrawing the "surplus" before it passes into the corporate limits.
Where the outside consumer taps the regular water system primarily located
within the municipality. In all three situations, the city may charge what the
traffic will bear.
"1City of South Norfolk v. City of Norfolk, 58 S. E. (2d) 32, at 38 (Va. 1950).
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way would be open by which the city could nullify its obligation
to serve under the 1918 statute, inasmuch as rates could easily be
placed beyond the ability of the consumers to pay, thereby stifling
the demand that the city furnish water.
If the court finds the authority and the means to set what it
deems to be a reasonable rate, a cumbersome system of rate control
by judicial decree would be established. The inadequacy of this system of rate fixing has been so widely conceded that regulation by
administrative agencies has generally supplanted court control. The
Virginia legislature, itself, has recognized the advantages of administrative control by vesting in the State Corporation Commission the
authority to fix rates of public utility companies. 16
If the court would accept the fact that a municipality dealing
beyond its boundary is engaging in acts of a private nature, 1" and in
such situation should fall within the purview of the jurisdiction of
the State Corporation Commission, the difficulties would be reduced
to a minimum. But unless that step is taken, the only means of obtaining a prompt and satisfactory definition of the rights and obligations
between a city and its non-resident water customers seems to be in
a thorough-going revision of the pertinent statutes.
ROBERT C. LouTHIAN,

JR.

PROCEDURE-CONcLUSIVENESS OF LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT AFTER DisMISSAL OF APPEAL ON BASIS OF MooTNEss. [Federal]
As a branch of the broad rule of res judicata, the doctrine of
collateral estoppel operates as a bar to relitigation of matters once
actually litigated and determined in an initial suit between the
parties who subsequently seek to renew the controversy under a
different cause of action. Under this doctrine only those matters
which were not at issue in the first proceeding may be litigated in
the second.' Its application must necessarily be flexible since the
doctrine is subject to the somewhat vague limitation that it should
"Va. Const.

(1902)

Art. XII, § 156 (B).

'See Light v. City of Danville, 168 Va. i81, 213, 190 S. E. 276, 289 (1937)
(dissenting opinion).
'The doctrine was expressly interpreted by the Supreme Court in Cromwell
v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 352, 24 L. ed. 195 (1876). It has recently been
repeated unmodified in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U. S.
591, 597, 68 S. Ct. 715, 719, 92 L. ed. 898 (1948). Under this rule issues which were
not, but which might have been litigated in the prior suit are not barred from
litigation under a second cause of action.
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not be applied if injustice would result. Thus, its specific scope has
never been absolutely defined.
That an outstanding diversity of opinion as to the operation of
the doctrine still exists was recently illustrated in the case of United
States v. Munsingwear, Inc.2 The controversy arose as a result of the
dismissal, on the grounds of mootness, of an appeal s brought by the
plaintiff, United States, from a judgment 4 denying a decree enjoining
the defendant, Munsingwear, Inc., from an alleged violation of
maximum price regulations. The original complaint in two counts,
first for injunction and second for damages, had been separated into
two suits, and by agreement between the parties the damages suit
was continued pending the outcome of the injunction suit. After the
federal district court had entered judgment on the merits for the
defendant in the injunction suit, and while appeal thereon was
pending, the commodities involved were decontrolled by government
order, thus rendering the appeal moot. Having been denied the
injunction, the plaintiff then sought, in the case here under discussion, to recover damages, as provided in the Emergency Price Control
Act, for the alleged violation thereof. Such an action would involve a
relitigation of the precise questions brought into issue in the injunction
case. The complaint in this action for damages was dismissed by the
district court as barred by the previous adjudication, and from this
dismissal the plaintiff appealed. The judgment was affirmed in the
Court of Appealsu but with one Justice dissenting.
The majority of the court held that the judgment of the appellate
court in the injunction case was an "unconditional dismissal" of the
appeal and, as such, did not disturb the conclusiveness of the lower
court's judgment with regard to issues litigated therein. The dissent
maintained that unconditional dismissal of the appeal on the basis
of mootness did not leave the judgment of the lower court conclusive
as to issues not considered on appeal. 6
When confronted with the obligation of disposing of an appeal
on the grounds of mootness, 7 the courts have sometimes anticipated
'178 F. (2d) 204 (C. A. 8th, 1949).
'Fleming v. Munsingwear, Inc., 162 F. (2d) 125 (C. C. A. 8th, 1947).
"Bowles v. Munsingwear, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 933 (D. C. Minn. 1945). Chester
Bowles, Administrator, Office of Price Administration, filed the original complaint.
Paul A. Porter, as Administrator of the Office of Price Admiinstration, succeeded
Bowles. Porter was succeeded by Phillip B. Fleming, Administrator, Office of
Temporary Controls, and Fleming was eventually succeeded by the United States,
which, of course, was at all times the real party in interest.
iUnited States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 178 F. (2d) 204 (C. A. 8th, 1949).
GUnited States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 178 F. (2d) 204, 209 (C. A. 8th, 1949)
7

Where some event has intervened without fault of either party, while appeal
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the effect of their judgments as res judicata. Where it has been felt
that to leave the judgment of the lower court in force would work a
hardship on one party, appellate courts have taken steps to avoid
such a result. 8 One method adopted by reviewing courts to qualify
the scope and effect of their judgments as res judicata has been expressly to reserve to the parties the right to relitigate rights, questions,
or facts brought into issue in the lower court. 9
For example in Gelpi v. Tugwell, ° where a writ of mandamus
was sought by the plaintiff to restore her to her government position,
her term of office expired while appeal was pending. In order to
prevent the lower court's judgment from becoming res judicata as
to issues which the plaintiff might wish to resubmit in a subsequent
action, such as an action for past salary, the court, in dismissing the
appeal as moot, expressly reserved to the plaintiff the right to relitigate those issues. This procedure affords the courts a method of declaring a judgment res judicata as to particular issues and not as to
others if such specific definition be deemed necessary for just results.
However, where it has been desirable to leave all issues open to
relitigation, some courts have adopted the method of reversing the
lower judgment and remanding the cause with directions to the
is pending, which renders the relief sought impossible, the appeal must be dismissed.
Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651, 16 S. Ct. 132, 40 L. ed. 293 (1895).
8
Shaw v. Birk, 67 F. (2d) 851 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1934); Chicago and N. W Ry. Co.
v. Fueland, 289 Fed. 783 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923); National Surety Co. v. Shafer, 57
Co1. 56, 140 Pac. 199 (1914); Bigham v. Yundt, 158 Ga. 6oo, 123 S. E. 87o (1924);
Mercer v. Gray, 1O9 S. W

(2d) 1107 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). Motion to dismiss

appeal without prejudice is denied where the facts are before the court and
the interests of the parties demand termination of the controversy. Quinn v.
Kenton and Campbell Benevolent and Burial Ass'n, 221 Ky. 750, 299 S. W
989 (1927).
9In Blackman v. Stone, 300 U. S. 641, 57 S. Ct. 514, 81 L. ed. 856 (1937), an

injunction was sought against omitting the Communist Party nominees from
ballots. The election having been held while the appeal was pending, the Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal as moot, but expressly "without prejudice" to any
action which might have remained in the cause. The Court apparently felt
that such stipulation was essential to prevent the judgment of the lower court's
operating as a bar to a relitigation of the issues involved.
1123 F (2d) 377 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941). The dissenting Justice in the Munsingwear
case denied that a "reservation" was made in the Gelpi case and asserted that
the court in that case stated as a matter of law that its judgment would not become
res judicata as to issues litigated in the lower court. However, from the opinion
of the majority in the Gelpi case as well as the statement of the dissenting
the court, in dismissing the appeal as moot, reserves to
Justice, that "
appellant the right to raise in subsequent litigation the same issues which
she sought to have us pass on in the present case." 123 F. (2d) 7, 379 (C. C. A.
Ist, 1941), it seems clear that such a reservation was made.
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lower court to dismiss the bill of complaint.'1 The effect of this procedure is to vacate the entire proceedings leaving no judgment on
2
the issues in force.'
Thus, in Leader v. Apex Hosiery Company,13 the Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled that the action for damages before the court was
not barred by a prior judgment on the same issues because the prior
judgment had been vacated. The initial suit' 4 had been brought for

an injunction against a strike which ended after the court had denied
the injunction and while appeal was pending. The Supreme Court
had reversed the lower court's judgment and remanded the cause
with directions to dismiss the complaint since the appeal had become
moot.' 5 The effect of this action, as subsequently declared by the
Circuit Court of Appeals, was to vacate the entire proceedings, thus
leaving the parties in the same position as if the original suit for
injunction had been as untimely as the appeal. 16 The issues were
therefore open to relitigation.
In these cases where the courts have made express qualifications
as to the scope of their judgments, the intent has been to prevent the
dismissal of the appeal from leaving the judgment of the lower court
conclusive as to issues there litigated, when such was necessary to
prevent injustice.
Assuming that appeal in the Munsingwear case was unconditionally dismissed, the question arose as to the conclusiveness of the
judgment of the court of first instance in that event. In holding that
the prior judgment was a bar to subsequent litigation, the majority
of the court invoked the general rule of res judicata as set forth by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Southern Pacific Ry. Co.
v. United States as follows: "The general principle announced in
numerous cases is that a right, question or fact distinctly put in issue
uBrownlow v. Swartz, 261 U. S. 216, 43 S. Ct. 263, 67 L. ed. 620 (1923); South
Spring Hill Gold Mining Co. v. Amador Medean Gold Mining Co., 145 U. S.
300, 12 S. Ct. 921, 36 L. ed. 712 (1892); Leader v. Apex Hosiery Co., io8 F. (2d)
71 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939); Knowlton v. Town of Swampscott, 28o Mass. 69, 181 N. E.
849 (1932).
WIn Brownlow v. Swartz, 261 U. S. 216, 43 S. Ct. 263, 67 L. ed. 620 (1923), a
writ of mandamus was sought by the plaintiff, the performance having been completed while the appeal was pending. The Supreme Court, observing that the
case had become moot, asserted its inability to decide the case on its merits, and
noting its unwillingness to leave the lower judgment in force without reason,
concluded that it must reverse and remand in order to vacate the lower judgment.
"so8 F. (2d) 71 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939)2AApex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, go F. (ad) 155 (C. C. A. 3 d, 1937).
"Leader v. Apex Hosiery Co., 302 U. S. 656, 58 S. Ct. 362, 82 L. ed. 508 (1937).
"Leader v. Apex Hosiery Co., io8 F. (2d) 7V, 81 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
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and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, as a
ground of recovery, cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between
the same parties, or their privies; and even if the second suit is for
a different cause of action, the right, question or fact once so determined must, as between the same parties or their privies, be taken
as conclusively established, so long as the judgment in the first suit
remains unmodified."' 7 The majority opinion was that since the
issues sought to be relitigated had been distinctly put in issue and
directly determined on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction-the lower court in the injunction suit-and since the judgment
entered in that action remained unmodified, the controversy fell
within the scope of the doctrine and was barred.
The assumption that the doctrine invoked by the majority of
the court must rigidly operate as a bar to subsequent litigation under
a different cause of action was attacked by the dissenting justice who
foresaw in such a view the possibility of harsh results. He relied principally on Scott's view' 8 which has been adopted by the American
Law Institute: "Where a party to a judgment cannot obtain the
decision to an appellate court because the matter determined against
him is immaterial or moot, the judgment is not conclusive against
him in a subsequent action on a different cause of action."'19
The reasoning of the dissenting justice, and of Scott's, 20 Is in this
respect that the majority view is an unnecessarily strict application
of the doctrine and should not be applied so as to deprive the losing
party in a trial court of the opportunity to have the validity of the
trial court's action reviewed. Where appeal does not lie, this result
is inevitable if the party is prevented from bringing up the issues
under a different cause of action.
The majority view, however, is not the unreasoning adherence
to rigid policy that the dissent argues, because it invokes the doctrine
of collateral estoppel as a bar to subsequent litigations of issues once
U. S. 1, 48, 18 S. Ct. 18, 27, 42 L. ed. 355 (1897).
"8"The fact that a party who might have appealed fails to do so ss immaterial;
but the fact that he is unable to appeal is of importance.
"One illustration of this is where an appeal is denied because a controversy
has become moot. In such a case the judgment itself may stand, but matters
decided are not conclusive by way of collateral estoppel sn a subsequent controversy
between the parties involving a different cause of action." Scott, Collateral Estoppel
By Judgment (i942) 56 Harv. L. Rev. i, 15.
17168

"Restatement, Judgments (1942) § 69 (2).

-"Professor Austin Scott in conlunction with Professor Warren Seavey wrote
the Restatement of Judgments for the American Law Institute. It is this authority
as well as the article by Scott, Collateral Estoppel By Judgment (1942) 56 Harv. L.
Rev. i, upon which the dissenting justice relies most strongly.
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determined only so long as the initial judgment on those issues remains
unmodified. That the appellate courts may, in dismissing moot appeals,
exercise their discretion to qualify the effect of their judgments has
already been illustrated. The opinion of the majority of the court,
that some express modification of the lower court's judgment must
be made in order to disturb its conclusiveness, protects this discretionary power of the courts. The dissent would declare absolutely
that dismissal of a moot appeal would leave the issues open to relitigation. But since, under the majority view, the reviewing court has
the power so to modify the effect of its judgment as to avoid the
possibility of the appellant's being deprived of an appeal, there seems
to be little reason for establishing, with such rigidity, the rule which
the dissent seeks to invoke.
In Johnson Company v. Wharton,21 the Supreme Court of the
United States dearly pointed out that the fact that a party is prevented from appealing an issue because of circumstances beyond his
control does not affect the conclusiveness of the lower court's judgment on that issue.22 To limit the effect of the doctrine of res judicata
to those cases which can be reviewed on the merits by a higher court
would be to remove from the scope of the doctrine all judgments
which become moot at a time when review can still be sought. The
effect of a judgment as res judicata is so important as to make it
rather doubtful whether a party should be permitted to defeat this
effect merely by showing that the controversy has become moot
during this time,23 when, in fact, no appeal had been sought or contemplated.
The fact that circumstances beyond the control of either party
operate to prevent a review of the lower court's judgment on the
issues cannot be said to justify, in every case, a relitigation of those
issues in subsequent actions. Where allowing such relitigation would
be justified, the appellate courts can do so. Where the initial judgment remains undisturbed by the judgment of the appellate court in
dismissing a moot appeal, the initial judgment is final within the
U. S. 252, 14 S. Ct. 608, 38 L. ed. 429 (1894).
2In discussing the inquiry as to the conclusiveness of a prior judgment after
an appeal has been denied, the court stated: "The existence or non-existence of a
right, in either party, to have the judgment in the prior suit reexamined, upon
-1152

appeal or writ of error, cannot, in any case, control this inquiry

.

Looking at

the reasons upon which the rule rests, its operation cannot be restricted to those
cases, which, after final judgment or decree, may be taken by appeal or writ

of error to a court of appellate jurisdiction." 152 U. S. 252, 261, 14 S. Ct. 6o8, 61,
38 L. ed. 429, 434 (1894).
2Note (1945) 157 A. L. R. io44.
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meaning of res judicata, 24 and this effect cannot be said to subject
the appellant to "harsh" results simply because an appeal does not
lie. The appellant's constitutional right is satisfied by his "day in
court" in the lower tribunal. 25 The fact that the legislature, acting
under its constitutional authority to distribute the judicial powers,
has provided for a system of appeals does not make the appeal a part
of the litigant's constitutional right. Therefore, to hold that a judgment, from which no appeal lies, is within the scope of the rule of
res judicata does not prejudice any right of the appellant. 26
The majority view in the present case clearly appears to be
stronger. Until action is taken by the reviewing court expressly for
the purpose of modifying the judgment appealed from, such judgment remains unmodified, and, under the general rule as interpreted
by the Supreme Court, remains conclusive. The argument that application of the doctrine in the light of this interpretation will lead to
injustice is untenable. A highly desirable close adherence to the basic
principles of the doctrine, through which it has served to put an end
to litigation and to stabilize our jurisprudence, is illustrated by the
court in this case.
It has been suggested by Scott that where a controversy has become moot before being passed upon, the reviewing court, instead
of merely dismissing the appeal or affirming the judgment of the
court below, should reverse or set aside the judgment and dismiss
the suit, or direct the lower court to do so. 27 This suggestion appears
to be sound, but should be subject to the qualification that such
procedure should be adopted only if the reviewing court determines
"It is a general rule that a judgment sought to be used as a basis for
the application of the doctrine of res judicata must be a final judgment. Swift
v. McPherson, 232 U. S. 51, 34 S. Ct. 239, 58 L. ed. 499 (1914). However, the scope
of the term "final judgment" within the meaning of the rule here under consideration, has been declared not to be confined to a final judgment in an action,
but to include any judicial decision upon a question of fact or law which is not
provisional and subject to change in the future by the same tribunal. Bannon v.
Bannon, 27o N. Y. 484, 1 N. E. (2d) 975, io5 A. L. R: 14oI (1936).
'If Congress fails to provide for such a review, the initial judgment stands
as the judgment of the court of last resort and settles finally the rights of the
parties which are involved. Ex parte State of Pennsylvania, iog U. S. 174, 3 S. Ct.
84, 27 L. ed. 894 (1883)-OSee Johnson Co. v. Wharton, 152 U. S. 252, 26o, i4 S. Ct. 6o8, 611, 38 L. ed.

429 (1894). Also, it is difficult to see why the appellant in the Munsingwear case
should be considered to have been harshly treated when he is merely bearing the
consequences of his own election to separate the causes of action. Had he proceeded
with the original bill in two counts, the appeal would not have been moot as to
the damages count and would not have been dismissed on this basis.
'Scott, Collateral Estoppel By Judgment (1942) 56 Harv. L. Rev. i.
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that the issue must be left open to relitigation in order to prevent
injustice. Thus, in disposing of moot appeals, the middle ground of
dismissal "without prejudice" in which the present controversies arise
would be eliminated.
THOMfAS

R.

McNAMARA

PROCEDURE-EFFECT OF FRAUD IN TOLLING OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
OF "SuBsTANTIVE"

NATURE.

[Federal]

Generally, courts will not imply exceptions not expressly stated in
statutes of limitations. Unless the statute specifies otherwise, infancy,1
mental incapacity,2 coverture, 3 death of one against whom the
statute of limitations has been running,4 impnsonment, 5 absence from
the state6 and evasion of process 7 will not toll a statute of limitations.8
Nevertheless, the courts have found it necessary to imply exceptions
where the suit is based on fraud9 or duress, 10 or there has been a
fraudulent concealment of the cause of action,1 1 or legal proceedings
have been instituted which prevent enforcement of the remedy,1 2 or
'Vance v. Vance, 108 U. S. 514, 2 S. Ct. 854, 27 L. ed. 8o8 (1883); Boyle v.
Boyle, 126 Iowa 167, 1o N. W. 748, 3 Ann. Cas. 575 (1904).
-Collier v. Smaltz, 149 Iowa 23o, 128 N. W 396, Ann. Cas. 1912C 1007 (1910);
Walrod v. Nelson, 54 N. D. 753, 20o N. W 525 (1926).
Wance v. Vance, io8 U. S. 514, 2 S. Ct. 854, 27 L. ed. 8o8 (1883); Re Deaner,
126 Iowa 701, o02N. W. 825, io6 Am. St. Rep. 374 (19o5).
'McLeran v. Benton, 73 Cal. 329, 14 Pac. 879, 2 Am. St. Rep. 814 (1887);
Griffin v. Hannum, 185 Okla. 433, 93 P. (2d) 1078 (1939).
iMosgrave v. McManus, 24 N. M. 227, 173 Pac. 196, L. R. A. 19 18F 348 (1918).
6
Rock Island Plow Co. v. Masterson, 96 Ark. 446, 132 S. W 216 (igio); Kissane
v. Brewer, 208 Mo. App. 244, 232 S. W xxo6 (1921).
'Amy v. City of Watertown, 130 U. S. 320, 9 S. Ct. 537, 32 L. ed. 953 (1889);
Engel v. Fischer, 102 N. Y. 400, 7 N. E. 300, 55 Am. Rep. 818 (1886).
sFor a general discussion of the subject: 34 Am. Jur., Limitation of Actions
§§ 186-250.
DExploration Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 435, 38 S. Ct. 571, 62 L. ed. 12oo
(1918); Smith v. Blachley, 198 Pa. 173, 47 At. 985, 53 L. R. A. 849 (9-oi). There
is conflict in the cases as to whether fraud should toll statutes of limitations.
American Jurisprudence states that it is probably the majority doctrine that
fraud should toll statutes of limitations, but Corpus Juris Secundum does not
state a majority rule. Equity courts have consistently held that fraud does toll
the statutes of limitations. 34 Am. Jur., Limitation of Actions § 163; 54 C. J. S.,
Limitations of Actions §§ 184, 186.
"Allen v. Leflore County, 78 Miss. 671, 29 So. 161 (i9oi); Spiva v. Boyd, 20o6
Ala. 536, 90 So. 289 (1921).
21Waugh v. Guthrie Gas, Light and Fuel Co., 37 Okla. 239, 131 Pac. 174, L. R. A.
1917B 1253 (1913); Texas & P Ry. Co. v. Gay, 88 Tex. iii, 3o S. W 543 (1895).
2
Logan v. Yancey, 161 Ga. 579, 131 S. E. 514 (1926); Wakefield v. Brown, 38
Minn. 361, 37 N. WV 788, 8 Am. St. Rep. 671 (1888).
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where the courts have been closed to the plaintiff because of war,13 or
commencement of suit on the cause of action. 14 The statute begins to
run in the case of fraud or fraudulent concealment when the facts
become known to the injured party;' 5 it commences to run in the
case of duress or undue influence when the influence is removed;' 6
and if the courts have been closed to the plaintiff because of war, the
statute begins to run upon the termination of hostilities.Y7
But the rules set out above are not applied uniformly to all periods
of limitation. Courts have widely announced that they apply only to
those statutes limiting the time in which the traditional forms of
action may be brought. If the period of limitation limits a new liability, for which there was not a remedy at common law, and is a part
of the statute which creates the liability or applies specifically to such
a statute, it is not a statute of limitations. Rather, it is said to be a
condition to the right, and failure to bring suit within the period
specified bars the right,i8 whereas failure to bring suit within the
limitation of a customary statute does not affect the right, but merely
bars the remedy.' 9 Those periods of limitation which are held to be
a condition to the right are termed "substantive," while the customary
statutes of limitations are called "remedial." In accordance with this
distinction it is said that substantive periods of limitation are to be
regarded "as an absolute bar not removable by any of the ordinary
'20
exceptions or answers to the statute of limitations.
Though the federal courts have generally applied the distinction
to bar statutory actions based on the Federal Employers' Liability
Act and similar enactments, 2' several federal decisions of recent years
indicate what may be a trend toward abandonment of the substantive
"Hanger v. Abbot, 6 Wall. 532, 18 L. ed. 939 (U. S. 1867); Perkins v. Rogers,
35 Ind. 124, 9 Am. Rep. 639 (1871).
'McIlroy

v. Mulholland, 169 Ark. 1212, 277 S. W

16 (1925);

Anderson v.

Biazzi, 166 Va. 3o9, 186 S. E. 7 (1936).
"See notes 8 and 1o, supra.
'See note 9, supra.
"See note 12, supra.
"34 Am. Jur., Limitation of Actions §§ 7, 11; 53 C. J. S., Limitations of
Actions §§ 1,6.
2'34 Am. Jur., Limitation of Action § 1i; 53 C. J. S., Limitations of Actions § 6.
"°Hill v. Town of New Haven, 37 Vt. 501, 510 (1865).
"A. J. Phillips Co. v. Grand Trunk W R. Co., 236 U. S. 662, 35 S. Ct. 444,
59 L. ed. 774 (1915) (dealing with the Interstate Commerce Act); United States
ex rel. Texas Cement Co. v. McCord, 233 U. S. 157, 34 S. Ct. 550, 58 L. ed. 893 (1914)
(action on bond of a public contractor); United States ex rel. Nitkey v. Dawes, 151
F. (2d) 639 (C. C. A. 7 th, 1945) (Informers Act); Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co.,
io8 F. (2d) 762 (C. C. A. 2d, ig4o) (limitation on actions on patents); Rademaker
v. E. D. Flynn Export Co., 17 F. (2d) 15 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1927) (Jones Act).
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limitations concept. The most recent of these cases, Scarborough v.
Atlantzc Coast Lne R. Co.,22 involved a suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act by a young man injured at the age of seventeen
while in the employ of the defendant interstate carrier. The agent
of the defendant had admitted liability for the injury, but had suggested that the plaintiff postpone his claim until he had reached his
majority at which time the extent of the damages sustained by the
plaintiff could be more accurately determined. The defendant's agent
had represented that if the plaintiff was not satisfied at that time by
the settlement offered, he would have three years after reaching his
majority in which to bring suit on his claim. Upon becoming of age
the plaintiff again commenced negotiations with the defendant for
settlement of the claim. In these negotiations the defendant denied
all liability and indicated that it would plead the Statute of Limitations, the period in the Federal Employers' Liability Act being three
years. The District Court followed the traditional view and held that
the principle of estoppel would not avail the plaintiff because the
period of limitation prescribed in the statute was substantive rather
than remedial. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, although
recognizing that the weight of authority sustained the District Court,
pointed to three recent cases, 23 each distinguishable on their fact§ but
ni78 F. (2d) 253 (C. C. A. 4th, (1949).
2Osbourne v. United States, 164 F. (2d) 767 (C. C. A. 2d, 1947); State of
Maryland to Use of Burkhardt v. United States, 165 F. (2d) 869, 1 A. L. R. (2d)
213 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1947); Frabutt v. N. Y., Chicago and St. Louis R. Co. 84 F. Supp.
46o (W. D. Pa. 1949).
In the Osbourne case the plaintiff sought to recover for injuries sustained
while employed as a merchant manner on defendant's vessel. The plaintiff was
interned by Japan on December 8, 1941 and was not returned to this country
until October, 1945. The suit was commenced in July, 1946. The defendant
pleaded the period of limitation and the defense was sustained by the District
Court. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.
"Neither do we think that distinction should be made because of the type
of statute of limitations involved. All statutes of limitations are based on the assumption that one with a good cause of action will not delay bringing it for an
unreasonable period of time; but when a plaintiff has been denied access to the
courts, the basis of the assumption has been destroyed. Whatever the reasons for
describing this type of statute of limitations as substantive rather than procedural
we think we do the distinction no violence by holding that either type of statute
will toll for one who is a prisoner in the hands of the enemy in time of war." 164
F. (2d) 767, 769 (C. C. A. 2d, 1947).
The plaintiff in the Burkhardt case was the beneficiary of deceased killed in
a collision with a United States Army vehicle. The suit was under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, the period of limitation specified in the statute being three
years. One year was the period of limitation in the wrongful death statute of
Maryland, the applicable state law. Suit was brought between one and three years
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inconsistent with the substantive statute of limitations theory, and
is by no means so rock-ribbed or so
found "that the distinction

24
hard and fast as many writers and judges would have us believe."

The court went on to hold that fraud will toll the period of limitation provided in the Federal Employers' Liability Act because "The
ancient maxim that no one should profit by his own conscious wrong
is too deeply imbedded in the framework of our law to be set aside
by a legalistic distinction between the closely related types of statutes
25
of limitations.
The recognition of a difference between remedial and substantive
statutes of limitations seems to be the result of courts applying a
different rule of law only because the fact situations differ. Cases
developing this distinction merely state that because the period of
limitation is a part of a statute creating a right and remedy unknown
to the common law, the exceptions to the statute of limitations do not
apply. These decisions give no reason for their conclusions; the courts
26
merely state the facts and set out their conclusions in brief opinions,
after the cause of action accrued. The Circuit Court of Appeals held, reversing
the District Court, that the suit was not barred by the statute of limitations.
"And we think it makes no difference that the limitation applicable to the
action for death by wrongful act is held under state law to be a condition on
the exercise of the right rather than a limitation on the remedy. This holding
is based upon the narrow ground that the limitation is imposed by the statute
creating the cause of action and is, to say the best of it, technical and legalistic
reasoning, which is not followed in all states." 165 F. (2d) 869, 873, 1 A. L. R. (2d)
213, 22o (C. C. A. 4th, 1947).
In the Frabutt case a resident alien was killed in 1942 while in the employ
of the defendant interstate carrier. Suit was commenced in 1948 by the administrator in behalf of the alien beneficiaries, residents of Italy, under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act.
"There is no question that the Federal Employers' Liability Act created a
cause of action unknown to the common law. The statute of limitations of three
years in the Act is a matter of substance which limits the rights given as well
as the remedy. That such a limitation, if not complied with, not only bars the
remedy but destroys the liability
" taking into consideration that statutes of limitations, in fixing a definite
period for the bringing of suits, proceed upon the principle that the courts where
the person to be prosecuted resides, or the property to be reached is situated,
are open during the prescribed period to the suitor, and in view of the fact
that the law of nations which closed the courts to alien enemies renders compliance with the statute impossible, it is only fair and just that the operation of
" 84 F. Supp. 460, 464 (V D. Pa
statutes of limitations should be suspended
1949)-

Both the Frabutt case and the Osbourne case contain dictum to the effect that
fraud will not toll substantive statutes of limitations.
24178 F. (2d) 253, 259 (C. C. A. 4th, 1949).
2178
F. (2d) 253, 259 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1949).
6
For especially brief discussions: The Harrisburg, i19 U. S. 199, 7 S. Ct. 140,
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stated in conceptualistic terms, without pointing to any desirable
27
results to be achieved.
Notwithstanding the insistence of the courts that ordinary statutes
of limitations affect the remedy only, all periods of limitation are
substantive in that destruction of the remedy amounts for practical
purposes to a destruction of the right, inasmuch as it virtually deprives
the injured party of all means of recovery. Only in exceptional circumstances is this not true, as where the mortgage debt is barred by
the statute of limitations but the mortgage security interest survives
the barring of the debt.2 8 There it may be argued that only the remedy
is affected. But if the value of the security has depreciated below the
amount of the debt, the mortgagor cannot get a deficiency decree in a
proceeding to enforce the mortgage lien if the debt is barred.20 Therefore, even in this situation the "remedial" statute affects the plaintiff's
right-that is, the plaintiff's ability to recover on his claim. To say
that a factor is "procedural" when in most situations for all practical
purposes it acts to prevent forever recovery of a claim, seems to expand
the idea of what is procedural beyond its natural scope.
One of the characteristics of a "substantive" statute of limitations
is that it is contained in a provision of the statute creating the liability
or that it applies specifically to the new cause of action. It has been
said that under these circumstances "there can be no doubt of the
legislative intention. It is manifest, in such a case, that the time element is an integral part of the right created
,"30 But tis is not a
3o L. ed. 358 (1886); Munos v. Southern Pacific Co., 51 Fed. 188 (C. C. A. 5 th,
(1892); Taylor v. Cranberry Iron and Coal Co., 94 N. C. 525 (1886); Bonte v. Taylor,
24 Ohio St. 628 (1874); Hill v. Town of New Haven, 37 Vt 501 (1865).
-7The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199, 7 S. Ct. 140, 3o L. ed. 358 (1886); Munos v.
Southern Pacific Co., 51 Fed. 188 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1892); Theroux v. Northern Pac,
R. Co., 64 Fed. 84 (C. C. A. 8th, 1894); Boyd v. Clarke, 8 Fed. 849 (C. C. E. D. Mich.
1881); Taylor v. Cranberry Iron and Coal Co., 94 N. C. 525 (1886); P. C. & St.
Louis R. R_ Co. v. Hine, 25 Ohio St. 629 (1874); Bonte v. Taylor, 24 Ohio St.
628 (1874); Hill v. Town of New Haven, 37 Vt. 501 (1865). None of the above cases
gives any reason for the results reached other than that the period of limitation is a section of the statute creating the liability. In P. C. & St. Louis R. R.
Co. v. Hine, a decision frequently cited, the court supported its position by invoking
the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed, hardly adequate support for the conclusions reached.
uPalmer v. White, 65 N. J. L. 69, 46 At. 7o6 (19oo); Hulbert v. Clark, 128
N. Y. 295, 28 N. E. 638, 14 L. R. A. 59 (1891); 2 Jones, Mortgages (8th ed. 1928)
§ 1542nSlingerland v. Sherer, 46 Minn. 422, 49 N. W 237 (1891); Hulbert v. Clarke,
57 Hun. 558, 11 N. Y. Supp. 417 (N. Y. i8go); 2 Jones, Mortgages (8th ed. 1928) § 1545.
11
Ailes, Limitation of Actions and the Conflict of Laws (1932) 31 Mich L.
Rev. 474, 495.
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reason for drawing a distinction between remedial aild substantive
periods of limitation. There is nothing to indicate that the legislature
intended to create a stronger limitation in the one instance than in
the other; 31 there is no convincing reason for saying that the so-called
substantive statute is any more a part of the statutory cause of action
than the ordinary statute of limitations is a part of the common law
causes of action. The purpose of the legislature in incorporating the
time restriction in the statute creating the right is merely to establish
a period of limitation for the new cause of action because the provisions of the general statutes of limitations might not apply to such
an action.
The policy underlying statutes of limitations is to compel the
settlement of claims within a reasonable time after their origin, and
before the facts and circumstances surrounding the claim are likely
to be forgotten. 32 The longer the enforcement of the claim is neglected,
the more difficult proof and refutation of the claim becomes and the
greater the likelihood of a fraud being perpetrated on the court. A
party with a valid claim should not be permitted to delay enforcing
his claim for such a period as will unreasonably increase the defendant's difficulties in disproving the claim. However, this policy comes
into conflict with even stronger policy considerations when the defendant has been guilty of fraud or duress. It is obvious that a party
should not be able to benefit by his own conscious wrong by depriving
the plaintiff of any knowledge of the wrong he has suffered. Under
these circumstances the defendant is responsible for the stale claim
presented against him, and he cannot avail himself of the policy of
the statute of limitations. The policy seeking prompt adjudication
of claims is as strong whether the claim is under a statute creating a
liability unknown to the common law or under one of the traditional
forms of action. Likewise, it is as undesirable that a person be permitted to profit by his fraud whether the fraud is perpetrated in
connection with a traditional cause of action or in connection with
a statutory claim.
The decision in the principal case will permit defrauded parties
to recover under circumstances where they will not be able to recover
nThis argument was recognized by the Massachusetts court but denied because
in the particular statute before the court a provision requiring that the defendant
be given notice of the claim before suit was commenced, contained in the same
sentence as the period of limitation, had previously been held to be a condition
to the right and therefore the period of limitation must also be of the same
nature. McRae v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., '99 Mass. 418, 85 N. E. 425, 15 Ann.
Cas. 489 (i9o8).
234 Am. Jur., Limitation of Actions §§ 9, io; C. J. S., Limitations of Actions § i.
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under the traditional view, and it therefore should be a force for
discouraging the employment of an obvious fraudulent device to avoid
payment of claims. Holdings that fraud does not toll substantive
statutes of limitations actually encourage fraud, because the defendant
has everything to gain and nothing to lose by pursuing a fraudulent
course of action.
The distinction between remedial and substantive statutes of
limitations has been refuted by some courts, 3 3 and the principal case

is a hopeful sign that this movement is gaining ground and that the
distinction may ultimately be discarded.
ALBERT F.

TORTS-CONSENT

ABORTION.

AS BAR TO

RECOVERY

OF

DAMAGES

FOR

KNIGHT

ILLEGAL

[Virginia]

The general rule has long been recognized in tort law that consent
to or participation in an immoral or illegal act is a bar to the recovery
of civil damages for injuries received as a result of such act.1 However, upon the premise that the state is interested in the life of an
individual, many courts early adopted the view that the rule will not
2
be applied where the authorized act constitutes a breach of the peace.
In a case of first impression in Virginia the Supreme Court of Appeals
was recently faced with the applicability of the exception where
damages were sought for death resulting from an illegal abortion.
In Miller v. Bennett,3 plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of
deceased, brought an action under the Virginia wrongful death
statute, alleging that the death was the result of an illegal abortion
performed by the defendant upon the plaintiff's decedent. The trial
court overruled the contention of defendant that proof of consent
to the illegal act would bar recovery, and the jury returned a verdict
for the plaintiff. In setting aside this verdict, the Supreme Court of
Appeals adhered to the view that consent bars recovery, and denied
relief upon the ground that "plaintiff's decedent, a mature married
"Chiles v. Drake, 2 Met. 146, 74 Am. Dec. 406 (Ky. 1859); Sharrow v. Inland
Lines, 214 N. Y. lox, io8 N. E. 217, L. R. A. 191 5 E 1192 (1915); Brookshire v.
Burkhart, 141 Okla. i, 283 Pac. 571, 67 A. L. R. 1059 (1929).
1

Goldnamer v. O'Bnen, 98 Ky. 569, 33 S. W. 831, 36 L. R. A. 715 (1896);
Bohlen, Consent as Affecting Civil Liability for Breaches of the Peace (1924) 24
Col. L. Rev. 81g; i Am. Jur., Actions § 17.
2The origin of this exception has been traced to a dictum in Matthews v.
Ollerton, Comb. 218, 9o Eng. Rep. 438 (1693). For a discussion of the history and
growth of the exception see Note (1949) 6 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 123.
Sigo Va. 162, 56 S. E. (2d) 217 (1949).
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woman, 4 was guilty of moral turpitude and participated in the violation of a general anti-abortion statute, enacted to effectuate a public
policy." 5
Lord Mansfield early laid down the general rule that one who
consents to an illegal act cannot recover damages for the consequences
of that act, on the maxim "volenti non fit injuria."6 But an exception
to this rule has subsequently been recognized in regard to injuries
arising out of an assault or battery, upon the theory that the state
was also wronged. "There are three parties here, one being the state
which for its own good, does not suffer the others to deal on the basis
of contract with the public peace. The rule of law is therefore dear
7
that consent to an assault is no justification." Though the great
majority of jurisdictions recognize this reasoning in permitting recovery regardless of consent where there has been a breach of the
peace,8 very few courts have seen fit to extend the exception to permit
recovery in the abortion cases where the plaintiff has consented to
the operation.9
Where civil recovery has been allowed, notwithstanding the consent, the orthodox exception has been adopted as a rule of law. 1°
'The consent to bar recovery must have been freely given by one legally able
to consent. True v. Older, 227 Minn. 154, 34 N. W (2d) 700 (1948). Thus, one
who is a minor by the state law will be allowed damages notwithstanding her
consent. Hancock v. Hullett, 2o3 Ala. 272, 82 So. 522 (1919).
WMiller v. Bennett, igo Va. 162, 171, 56 S. E. (2d) 2a7, 221 (1949).
6Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 342, 98 Eng. Rep. 112o (1775). Relief was not
denied upon the theory that no wrong had been done to plaintiff because of his
consent but on the reasoning that no court will aid a man whose cause of action
is founded upon an illegal act.
71 Cooley, Torts (4th ed.) 326. This reasoning has been severely criticized by
Bohlen. The statement that the state is a party in interest was true so long as the
Crown and the individual were interested in the outcome of the writ of trespass.
However, the Crown in 1694 began punishing misdemeanors by prosecutions and
thus the statement has not been true since then. Bohlen, Consent as Affecting
Civil Liability for Breaches of the Peace (1924) 24 Col. L. Rev. 819.
'See note 2, supra. Prosser, Torts (1941) 123.
ORecovery allowed: Martin v. Hardesty, 91 Ind. App. 239, 163 N. E. 61o (1928);
Lembo v. Donnell, 117 Me. 143, 103 Atl. 11 (1918); Milliken v. Heddeshesmer, 11o
Ohio St. 381, 144 N. E. 264 (1924); Miller v. Bayer, 94 Wis. 123, 68 N. W 869 (1869).
Recovery denied: Goldnamer v. O'Brien, 98 Ky. 569, 33 S.W 831, 36 L. R. A. 715
(1896); Szadwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 154 N. E. 251 (1926); Martin v. Morris,
163 Tenn. 186, 42 S. W (2d) 207 (1931); Androws v. Coulter, 163 Wash. 429, 1 P
(2d) 320 (1931).
"OSee note 9,supra. " certainly no argument is required to demonstrate
and is violative not only
that an act which is designed to take the life of one
of good morals but of the criminal laws of the state, is not one from the consequences of which he who commits the act may be relieved by reason of the previous
consent of the injured person." Milliken v. Heddeshesmer, 11o Ohio St. 381, 144
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"An agreement
to do an act which in itself is unlawful . is no
defense to an action for damages by a party who has been injured
by the doing of such act, though he made the agreement [and gave]
consent.""The courts denying recovery revert to the reasoning of Lord
Mansfield in Holman v. Johnson that "No Court will lend its aid to
a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal
act."121t is said such aid is refused not to protect the defendant but
because the plaintiff has violated a law of the state and thus has no
right to be assisted. This reasoning is not entirely convincing, because
though the victim has violated the law, she has nonetheless been
civilly wronged, and if the state feels its interest has been infringed
it may impose the criminal punishment.1 3 Likewise, a participant in
a voluntary fight has violated the law of the state, and yet the courts
allow recovery regardless of this consent.
In view of this discrepancy of result in the two types of cases,
several courts have attempted to distinguish the anti-abortion statutes
from the assault and battery statutes on the ground that the latter
are designed to protect the individual concerned from illegal acts
inherently fraught with danger to life and safety, whereas the former
were enacted for the protection of the unborn child rather than the
mother. 14 Thus, since the anti-abortion statutes are not enacted to
benefit the mother-plaintiff, the courts seem to conclude there is no
possible basis for saying that the state is a party in interest, 5 the
assumption which is necessary if consent is not to bar recovery. However, as the only real basis for thinking of the state as a party in
N. E. 264, 267 (1924). At least one jurisdiction has gone so far as to allow punitive
damages. Martin v. Hardesty, 91 Ind. App. 239, 163 N. E. 61o (1928).
"Adams v. Waggoner, 33 Ind. 531, 5 Am. Rep. 230, 233 (187o).
"Cowp. 842, 98 Eng. Rep. 112o, 1121 (1775).
"Whether or not the anti-abortion statute makes the woman an accomplice
has been regarded as immaterial in the civil action for her injuries resulting
from the illegal abortion. Miller v. Bennett, 19o Va. 162, 56 S. E. (2d) 217 (1949).
If by present state law the person seeking the abortion is not made an accomplice,
the state is free to change the existing law, so as to be in position to punish
future offenders, if it feels its interest has been invaded.
uNash v. Meyer, 54 Idaho 283, 31 P. (2d) 273 (1934); Herman v. Turner, 117
Kan. 733, 232 Pac. 864 (1925); Bowlan v. Lunsford, 176 Okla. 115, 54 P (2d)
666 (1936).
'"It seems the fatal fallacy in giving complete and exclusive recognition to
the rule laid down in battery cases [is that] we must assume two false
premises,
first, that the anti-abortion statute was designed to protect the woman, and, second,
that an illegal abortion is fraught with more danger to a woman than a legal
abortion or any other serious operation." Bowlan v. Lunsford, 176 Okla. 115, 54
P. (2d) 666, 668 (1936).
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interest in assault cases is to prevent breaches of the peace, that reasoning appears to involve a non-sequitur, for certainly the state is
also interested in preventing abortions. The only conceivable basis
for the distinction growing out of the two statutes is the view that
no civil wrong has been done to the mother. If this is true, she would,
of course, have no cause of action. 16 The Miller case expresses some
doubt as to the validity of this distinction, in denying relief not upon
the difference between the two classes of statutes but upon the fact
of plaintiff's participation in an illegal act. 17
Even though the anti-abortion statute is for the protection of the
child only, the deterrent effect of civil damages which supports the
exception allowing recovery in assault cases would best be attained
by allowing the mother to sue for her own injuries. Inasmuch as the
circumstances virtually preclude a cause of action ever enuring to
the child, the wrongdoer will be entirely free from civil liability unless
the mother's cause of action is sustained.
The courts which deny recovery argue that sanctioning civil
liability is not a proper way for the state to obtain retribution for
wrongdoing; if the state desires to punish the wrongdoer it should
do so through criminal proceedings.' s If this be true, however, it
seems that the same logic could be applied in arguing in favor of granting plaintiff a recovery, since so far as the state is concerned, punishment for both plaintiff and defendant should be in the form of fine or
imprisonment, not in denying or allowing civil damages. Likewise if
the theory upon which recovery is denied is concerned with setting up
a rule to deter future offenses of the same kind,O it will not substantiate a denial of civil relief in the abortion cases. When a person submits
to an illegal abortion she knows that if the attempt is not successful
the chances are high that she will not survive the operation. That
being true, she is not likely to calculate in advance whether she can
recover damages if the abortion is bungled.2 0 Therefore, setting up a
0

" No reported case supports such a view. All courts agree the mother has been

wronged. The diversity of opinion concerns the consent defense.
'Miller v. Bennett, igo Va. 162, 168, 56 S. E. (2d) 217, 220 (1949).
'SHunter v. Wheate, 289 Fed. 6o4, 31 A. L. R. 98o (App. D. C. 1923). See True
v. Older, 227 Minn. 154, 34 N. W (2d) 7oo, 703 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
"The theory is that knowledge of a person that he cannot get damages if he
is injured in a voluntary fight may deter him from entering into the affray. Bohlen,
Consent as Affecting Civil Liability for Breaches of the Peace (1924) 24 Col. L.
Rev. 8i9.
-"The right of the administrator to recover damages for wrongful death will
depend upon whether the decedent could have recovered had she lived. Street v.
Consumer Mining Corp., 185 Va. 561, 39 S. E. (2d) 271 (1946); Note (1947) 167
A. L. R. 894.
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rule that no damages can be obtained will not serve to deter persons
21
from seeking illegal abortions.
If deterrence is sought, and certainly civil damages rules should
be framed with a view to deterring future wrongs whenever feasible,
a rule warning possible aborters that they will be civilly as well as
criminally liable may have considerable effect.
I. LEAKE WORNO'M, JR.

TORTS-RIGHT oF HUSBAND PAYING MEDICAL EXPENSES To OBTAIN
REIMBURSEMENT FROM INJURED WIFE OUT OF DAMAGES RECOVERED
FROM TORTFEASOR.

[Virginia]

At common law, one who wrongfully injured a married woman
was liable to her husband for medical expenses incurred by him as
a result of such injury.' The husband's right of recovery in such a
case would seem to be predicated upon his common law duty of
support, which itself was a necessary concomitant of the rule that
upon marriage the husband became owner of is wife's personal
property. The tort, insofar as it necessitated the making of expenditures, was therefore a wrong against the husband, rather than the
wife, and it was the husband who was entitled to maintain an action
for expenses incurred.2 And even under many modern Married
Women's Statutes, the husband still has the right to recover for
expenses, except under unusual circumstances, as where the wife
3
has paid the expenses herself or is personally liable for them.
Of interest, because of the novelty of the factual situation and
the legal problem involved, the recent case of Floyd v. Miller4 rep"Several cases, upon somewhat questionable reasoning, have held the scope
of consent defense to be limited to the actual damages resulting from the abortion
itself, thus allowing recovery for negligent injury inflicted in treatment subsequent
to the abortion. True v. Older, 227 Minn. 154, 34 N. W. (2d) 7oo (1948); Androws
v. Coulter, 163 Wash. 429, i P. (2d) 320 (ig3i).

'Atlantic & Danville Ry. Co. v. Ironmonger, 95 Va. 625, 29 S. E. 319 (1898);
Richmond Ry. & Electric Co. v. Bowles, 92 Va. 738, 24 S. E. 388 (1896).
2"If she be injured in her person by the wrongful act of a stranger, a proximate,
legal consequence of such injury is the expense to which the husband is put in the
alleviation of her sufferings and the cure of her hurts; and such expense is a loss
to the husband, for which the wrongdoer is answerable to him in damages." Birmingham Southern Ry. Co. v. Lintner, 141 Ala. 420, 38 So. 363, 365 (19o4). See
also, Long, Domestic Relations (3 d ed. 1923) § 168.
iButler County R. Co. v. Lawrence, x58 Ark. 271, 250 S. W 340 (1923); Felker
v. Bangor Ry. & Electric Co., i12 Me. 255, 91 Ad. 980 (1914); Galtney et al v. Wood,
149 Miss. 56, 115 So. 117 (1928). In general, see Note (ig3o) 66 A. L. R. ii89.
4i9o Va. 303, 57 S. E. (2d) 114 (195o).
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resents an unusually broad interpretation of the effect of a Married
Women's Act upon the right of a husband to maintain an action for
medical expenses. The wife sustained personal injuries caused by
another's negligence; as a result she became incompetent and a committee was appointed to take charge of her affairs. A judgment was
recovered from the tortfeasor, the money being paid into the hands
of the committee. The husband, having paid certain hospital and
medical bills for his wife's treatment, sought reimbursement from
the committee.
By a four to three vote, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
held that the husband was not entitled to recover for the expenses
he had incurred. Chief reliance was placed upon the code section
governing suits by and against married women, which provides:
"In an action by a married woman to recover for a personal
injury inflicted on her she may recover the entire damage sustained including
expenses arising out of the injury, whether
chargeable to her or her husband
and no action for such
expenses
shall be maintained by her husband."-5
Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the court, declared that the
statute "iswholly devoid of implication or suggestion that any part
of the damages recoverable by the wife is to be held by her for her
"6
husband's benefit
Reliance was placed also upon the husband's common law duty
of support. Since "hospital and medical services for one's wife were
necessaries at common law for which a husband was liable," 7 it was
concluded that to require the wife to account to her husband for the
money received would be to compel her to assume an obligation
which "from time immemorial and by force of law was owing by him
as part and parcel of her support
"8
A different view of the statute was taken by the dissenting judges,
who urged a construction whereby the wife would be required to
account to the husband to the extent that he had incurred expenses.
They reasoned that the Act was intended simply to effect a change
in the form of the remedy available to the husband, and that "the
primary purpose was to avoid harassment of the defendant by multiple
litigation and to insure that all of the issues arising out of the tort
committed by him would be settled in one action." 9 The dissent,
'Va. Code Ann. (Michie,
OFloyd v. Miller, 19o Va.
'Floyd v. Miller, 19o Va.
"Floyd v. Miller, 19o Va.
9Floyd v. Miller, 19o Va.

1950) § 55-36.
3o3, 309, 57 S.
s03, 3o6, 57 S.
3o3, 309, 57 S.
303, 310, 57 S.

E.
E.
E.
E.

(2d)
(2d)
(2d)
(2d)

114,
114,
114,
114,

117
115
117
117

(1950).
(1950).
(195o).
(1950).
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agreeing with the majority that the statute did not destroy the right
of action for expenses but transferred it to the wife, took issue with
the court's construction of the Act as also transferring to the wife the
beneficzal nterest in the right of action. Such a result, it was felt by
the dissenting justices, "is contrary to all concepts of equity and
justice."' ° Hence it was argued that the wife's right of recovery
should be held to be for the benefit of her husband, to the extent
that he had actually borne expenses for medical treatment.
It seems too clear to admit of argument that the purpose of a
cause of action for medical expenses is to reimburse the party who
has paid the expenses or is liable for them.i l Hence it is that, even
under many modern Married Women's Statutes, the husband is entitled to recover for medical expenses,12 since he is the party liable
for their payment. The Virginia statute clearly does not destroy the
right of action for expenses, but, as is pointed out in the dissenting
opimon in the principal case, transfers the right from the husband
to the wife.13 From a procedural point of view such a transfer seems
not undesirable since its result will generally be to expedite the resolution of the controversy by preventing several actions against the tortfeasor.14 But when the statute is construed as directing a transfer to
the wife of the benefictal znterest in the right of action, a manifest
injustice will result unless the wife herself is liable for the expenses.
Where the wife has recovered damages for expenses incurred, the purpose of the husband's common law duty to provide her with medical
care is satisfied. If, in such a case, the husband has paid the expenses
or is liable for their payment, to deny him the right to reimbursement
is, in effect, to burden him with the consequences of the tortfeasor's
wrong and to compensate the wife twice. 5
"Floyd v. Miller, i9o Va. 303, 31, 57 S. E. 114, 117 (195o). The dissent pointed
out that the result would be particularly adverse to the interest of the husband in
cases where the wife is incompetent or the parties are estranged. It was also argued
that there would be no incentive on the part of the wife to minimize her expenses
because the greater the amount her husband would have to pay, the greater would
be her recovery from the wrongdoer. Since the husband could not recoup in any
way, the net effect would thus be a transfer of a part of hIs estate to the wife.
n"Payment of the expense of treatment is not essential to a recovery. If plaintiff
is liable for the debt incurred, that is all that is necessary
. If it was paid by
a volunteer, then plaintiff would not be entitled to recover on this item of damage."
Sykes v. Brown, 156 Va. 881, 887, 159 S.E. 202, 204 (1931). A difference of judicial
opinion exists as to the latter point. McCormick, Damages (1935) § 9o.
"See cases cited, note 3, supra.
1Floyd v. Miller, 19o Va. Sog, at 31o, 57 S.E. (2d) 114, at 117 (195o).
uFloyd v. Miller, i9o Va. 3oS, at 31o, 57 S. E. (2d) 114, at 117 (1950).
2It would seem that the wife's recovery for expenses should go to fulfill the
purpose of the damages award, which is the reimbursement of the party liable
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The contention of the dissent that the primary purpose of the
statute was to obviate the necessity for multiple suits against the tortfeasor seems to be well founded. The reason given for abolishing the
husband's right to recover for loss of services was the difficulty of
separating the damages between husband and wife.1 6 But it seems
quite clear that there is no practical difficulty involved in determining
the amount of expenses actually incurred by the husband. 7 An additional purpose of the legislation might have been to make certain
that the damages recovered would be used to pay for the wife's treatments, and not be misapplied by the husband.' 8 The construction
adopted by the court in the principal case goes further than is necessary in order to satisfy either of these purposes. Manifestly, the interests of the third party tortfeasor do not require that the husband not
be allowed to recover from the wife the amount of the expenses incurred; nor is there, in the principal case, any necessity for protecting
the wife against misappropriation by her husband, since she has
already received the benefit of the expenditures.
The language of the Virginia Act is somewhat broader than that
of some other statutes, in that it expressly forbids an action for expenses by the husband. 19 But it does not follow that the Act was
for the expenses. It appears difficult to justify a holding which allows the wife to
pocket the judgment proceeds (which are recovered for the express purpose of
paying her expenses) while her husband pays for her treatments. If the wife is
to be granted new rights as a legal being independent from her husband, she should
be required to assume the legal obligations normally concomitant to those rights.
"Judge Burks, one of the Code Revisors of igig, said (respecting the amendment of that year, which took away the husband's right to maintain an action
for loss of his wife's services): " .. but as it is very difficult to sever the damages
in such cases and tell what part should be recovered by the wife and what part
by the husband . it was deemed best to give her the entire damages and take
away the present right of the husband to bring a separate action for the loss of
such services." Burks, The Code of i9ig (igig) 5 Va. Law Reg. (N. s.) io8.
7
" See Floyd v. Miller, i9o Va. o3 , at 311, 57 S. E. (2d) 114, at 118 (195o).
18At least one case has based its decision upon this ground. "It is
common
knowledge
that husbands occasionally squander their substance and sometimes
desert their wives and otherwise fail in the performance of their full conjugal
duties. So far as policy is to be considered it points to the desirability of recovery
by the wife of this element of damage." Cassidy v. Constantine, 269 Mass. 56, 168
N. E. 169, 17o, 66 A. L. R. 1186, 1189 (199). For favorable comment upon this
holding, see McCormick, Damages (1935) 334.
"iStatutes in a number of states have provided simply that damages recovered
by a married woman in a personal injury suit are her separate property. Ala. Code
(194o) T. 34, § 68; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 38-i15; N. C. Gen. Stat. (1943)
§ 52-io; N. Y. Cons. Laws (1938) Ch. 14, Art. 4, § 51; Wis. Stat. (1947) § 246-07While the precise point of issue here appears not to have been litigated before
(because of the explicitness of the Virginia statute), it has been held that a husband
may recover from a wrongdoer for expense of his wife's treatments, notwithstanding
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intended to deprive the husband of the right to reimbursement. The
provision that no action may be maintained by the husband for expenses quite obviously refers to suits by the husband against the tortfeasor, and not to actions by the husband against the wife.
The court's contention that the statute contains no implication
that a right of action is to be created in favor of the husband against
the wife20 seems to be of doubtful merit because it is not necessary
that the statute so imply if its purpose is simply to effect a change in
the form of the remedy against the tortfeasor. And before the Act was
passed, it had been held that the action of assumpsit would lie between
husband and wife in Virginia.2 1 Hence, it is unnecessary that the
husband find express statutory authorization for bringing an action
of assumpsit against his wife if the elements of such an action are
present. 22 The facts of the principal case lend themselves peculiarly
to solution of the issue by an action of assumpsit. The wife has received money which in good conscience she ought not to retain; the
husband, having incurred expenses, should as a matter of practical
justice, be allowed reimbursement from the wife, who has already
received the benefit of the expenditures.
The result contended for by the dissent appears to be a proper
one, but that result should be obtained from without the legislation,
rather than by an application of it. The dissent's argument that the
statute should be interpreted as requiring the wife to account to her
husband is perhaps unduly broad, but it is submitted that at least
the statute should be construed as not forbidding reimbursement.
Then the court could proceed to decide whether or not reimbursement should be allowed, according to the particular circumstances
of each case.
J. FoRzEsTx

TAYLOR

a code provision that damages recovered by a marmi woman and the earnings of
a married woman are her separate property. Birmingham Southern Ry. Co. v.
Lintner, 141 Ala. 420, 38 So. 363 (19o4).
2OFloyd v. Miller, i9o Va. 3oS, at So9, 57 S. E. (2d) 114, at 117 (195o).
aMoreland v. Moreland, io8 Va. 93, 6o S. E. 730 (19o8). A number of later
Virginia cases are m accord with this holding. Buchanan v. Buchanan, 174 Va.
255, 6 S. E. (2d) 612 (i94o); Edmonds v. Edmonds, 159 Va. 652, 124 S. E. 415 (1924);
Moore v. Crutchfield, 186 Va. 20, 116 S. E. 482 (1923); Newman v. McComb, 112
Va. 408, 71 S. E. 624 (1911).
"While the cases cited rn note 21, supra, involve suits by a wife against her
husband, there seems to be no sound reason for denying the husband the right to
bring an action also. Especially is this true in view of Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950)
§ 55-56, which provides that a married woman may sue and be sued as if unmarried. The precise point has been decided in at least one jurisdiction. "There is
nothing in the public policy of this state which forbids a husband from bringing
an action against his wife to adjust property rights between them ... " Schleicher
v. Schleicher, 12o Conn. 528, 182 Ad. 162, 168, io4 A. L. R. 572, 574 (1935).

